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Many state Medicaid programs have recently adopted primary care case manage-
ment (PCCM) strategies as a means of containing costs and providing medical serv-
ices to the poor. At its best, PCCM may improve care for the poor by deterring
unnecessary services, monitoring quality of care, and expanding the number ofphysi-
cians willing to serve Medicaid patients. At its worst, PCCM may create financial
incentives to cut program budgets and maximize provider income at the expense of
medically necessary services to the poor. This Article examines the opportunities and
perils of the PCCM model as influenced by two opposing legal and public policy tradi-
tions. The first tradition rests on the proposition that the well-being and autonomy of
the patient is central to the doctor-patient relationship and to related legal and public
policy issues The second tradition is defined by reduction of the federal social wel-
fare role and by privatization-that is, a transfer of government's social welfare role
to for-profit organizations. Professor Rosenblatt argues that the success of Medicaid
primary care case management depends upon transcending a simple public/private
dichotomy, and integrating the patient-centered ideal into increasingly private and
cost-conscious administration of medical care to the poor.
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INTRODUCTION
AMERICANS HAVE LONG been deeply ambivalent about
health care and the poor. On the one hand, most Americans
apparently believe that adequate health care should be widely avail-
able to all regardless of ability to pay.1 However, actual practices
have provided most low-income patients with a markedly inferior,
"dual track" version of prevailing models of mainstream care.
2
From the colonial era through the nineteenth century, for example,
patients with economic and family resources received care in their
own homes from private physicians and family members. 3 In con-
trast, the poorest patients had to enter underfunded and often dan-
gerous public hospitals, which provided a kind of "substitute
household" organized on increasingly bureaucratic lines.4 Simi-
1. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH [hereinafter cited as PREsi-
DENT'S COMMISSION], I SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 4, 11, 18 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE]; M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 88
(1983); Arras, Retreat from the Right to Health Care: The President's Commission and Access
to Care, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 321 (1984); Iglehart, Medical Care of the Poor-A Growing
Problem, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 59, 59 (1985) (describing the United States as "a society
that likes to believe that it provides the essentials of life to its most vulnerable citizens, not by
chance but by law .... ). Even Alain Enthoven, a strong proponent of market competition
as the preferred means of organizing and distributing health care, states that "[m]ost Ameri-
cans consider access to a decent level of medical care to be a part of the right to 'life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.' Thus we are not willing to leave the distribution of medical
purchasing power to the market and other forces that determine income distribution." A.
ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 81 (1980).
2. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 72, 151-
52 (1982); Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medicaid Cure, 44 U.
CIN. L. REv. 643, 644-45 (1975); Rosenberg, Social Class and Medical Care in 19th Century
America: The Rise and Fall of the Dispensary, 29 J. HIST. MED. 32 (1974), reprinted in
SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 157 (J. Leavitt & R. Numbers eds. 1978). The phrase
"dual track" assumes the existence of two "tracks" or sub-systems of health care: an ade-
quate track based on fee-for-service practice for those who can afford to pay, and an inferior
track based on charity care for those who cannot. The realities of health care have always
been more complex than this simple model, as reflected, for example, in the traditional hospi-
tal accommodation distinctions among "ward," "semi-private," and "private" patients. See
R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY (1968). Analysts of contemporary
health policy now tend to speak of a three-tiered health care system: a government-financed
tier providing a "minimal level of health care for the poor and the elderly;" an employer-
financed middle tier; and a third, "free-market" tier for individuals who can pay more than
the bargained-for, wholesale rates paid by the government and employers. See Thurow,
Medicine versus Economics, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 611, 613 (1985); Dallek, Commentary, in
this Symposium.
3. See P. STARR, supra note 2, at 147-52, 72-77 (discussing the complex forces that
maintained and then undermined the family. as the preferred locus of health care in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries).
4. See id. at 149. In the colonial era, almshouses (where the sick poor often received
care) resembled ordinary residences, and were staffed by a "steward and a matron, who might
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larly, by the 1950's and 1960's most middle-income Americans were
covered by insurance that paid hospitals and doctors virtually
whatever they asked, at least for technical procedures and acute
care hospital stays, thereby securing financial access to hospitals
and private physicians.' In contrast, public insurance for poor pa-
tients under the Medicaid program is typically characterized by re-
strictive eligibility and substandard coverage, reimbursement, and
administration.6 With little purchasing power and other access dis-
abilities, many Medicaid patients are excluded from mainstream
hospital and medical care and are relegated to secondary markets of
less well-trained physicians and often seriously underfunded public
clinics and hospitals.7 The more than twenty million Americans
be husband and wife, [and who] presided over the hospital family .... [Platients entered at
the sufferance of their benefactors and had the moral status of children." Id The develop-
ment of hospitals in the nineteenth century saw an increasingly public architecture and bu-
reaucratic, rather than familial, organization, still designed "to take care of people who did
not fit into the system of family care." Id. at 151. On the dangerousness of early hospitals,
see id. at 72; on underfunding, see id at 172.
5. See, eg., Relman, What Is Happening to Our Health Care System?, BULL. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Mar. 1986, at 11, 15. For current data on health insurance, see SECUR-
ING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 1, at 90-92. On the relationship between increas-
ing health insurance for middle-income patients and increasing access to hospitals and
doctors, see Fox, The Consequences of Consensus: American Health Policy in the Twentieth
Century, 64 MILLANK Q. 76, 84 (1986).
6. On the inadequacies of Medicaid coverage, reimbursement, and administration up to
the early 1970's, see R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (1974); Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 643; REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RELATED PROGRAMS (1972); F. THOMPSON,
HEALTH POLICY AND THE BUREAUCRACY 115-18 (1981); Bellin, Foreshortened Frank
Memoirs of a Former Medicaid Administrator, in MEDICAID: LESSONS FOR NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE 325 (A. Spiegel & S. Podair eds. 1975). On continued inadequacies
(together with some achievements) through the early 1980's, see R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLA-
HAN, MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POLICY AND STATE CHOICES (1982); K.
DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 49-91 (1978).
7. Almost half (45.6%) of all Medicaid patients treated in private office practices are
treated by only 10% of physicians. Mitchell & Cromwell, Access to Private Physicians for
Public Patients: Participation in Medicaid and Medicare, in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE, supra note I, at 105, 113. Although these "large Medicaid practices" (LMPs) should
not be generally characterized as "Medicaid mills," there is "a serious 'credentials gap'
between primary care LMPs and those doctors serving fewer Medicaid patients. Mitchell
and Cromwell describe the Medicaid program as "a residual market that is secondary to the
better insured private market .. " Id. at 115. See also Dallek, Health Care for America's
Poor: Separate and Unequal, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 361, 366 (1986); NATIONAL
HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (NHELP), Increasing Clients' Access to Medicaid Providers: New
Developments, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1269, 1269-70 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Increas-
ing Clients'Access]; Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 652-53; H. LUFT, HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONS 322-23 (1981) (noting that in mid-1972 less than 20% of Orange County,
California, Medicaid eligibles received care through "mainstream providers"); Blake, Medi-
caid: The Fading of a Dream, HEALTH/PAC BULL., Apr. 1973, at 13, reprinted in MEDI-
CAID: LESSONS FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 6, at 341.
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without Medicaid or any other health care coverage face even more
serious access and quality-of-care problems.'
In the 1970's and 1980's, the American health care system ex-
perienced major changes, focused around the goal of health care
cost containment, the bargaining process and market competition.
Corporations suddenly acted as aggressive purchasers of health care
on behalf of their employees, seeking out prepaid health plans and
bargaining with hospitals and other providers to supply services at
discount rates.9 Entrepreneurs made large gains in the ownership
and management of hospitals, health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), and other health care sectors, leading to greater manage-
rial control and competitive marketing of health care services."0
Patients who remained in the traditional fee-for-service system be-
came subject to new restrictions by Blue Cross and other insurers
against payment for services that went beyond specified limits or
norms." Millions of other middle-income Americans began to en-
roll in HMOs that offered broader coverage in return for more re-
stricted access and different financial incentives for providers.
Reflecting the experience with HMOs, the concept of "primary care
case management" emerged from several sources as a major cost-
containment strategy in the Medicaid program."z Under this
8. See 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 1, at 92-108; Davis & Row-
land, Uninsured and Underserved: Inequities in Health Care in the U.S., in 3 SECURING
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note I, at 55; Iglehart, supra note I, at 59.
9. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS RE-
PORT, SPECIAL REPORT: CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CRISIS IN EMPLOYEE BEN-
EFITS 1-3 (1983).
10. See, eg., P. STARR, supra note 2, at 420-49; Relman, The New Medical-Industrial
Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980); Investor Owned Hospitals and Health Care
Costs, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370 (1983); Freedman, Megacorporate Health Care, 312 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 579 (1985); Kennedy, The Losses in the Profits: How Proprietaries Affect Public
and Voluntary Hospitals, HEALTH/PAc BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 5. A fascinating debate
on the ethical and policy implications of for-profit ownership can be found in Relman &
Reinhardt, Debating For-Profit Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1986, at 5.
11. See, eg., Berenson, A Physician's Perspective on Case Management, Bus. & HEALTH,
July-Aug. 1985, at 22, 22-23.
12. See, e.g., Spitz, Medicaid Case Management: Lessons for Business, Bus. & HEALTH,
July-Aug. 1985, at 16; Iglehart, Medicaid Turns to Prepaid Managed Care, 308 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 976 (1983); Gibson, Quiet Revolutions in Medicaid, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH
CARE 75, 84-85, 100-01 (J. Meyer ed. 1983); G. Omenn, Medicaid Under Reagan, Part One:
Fiscal Year 1982, at 2-8 (1984) (unpublished manuscript); Dallek & Wulsin, Limits on Medi-
caid Patients' Rights to Choose Their Own Doctors and Hospitals, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
281 (1983).
The term "case management" refers to several different concepts and programs, catego-
rized by Jeffrey Merrill as "social, primary care, and medical/social." Merrill, Defining Case
Management, Bus. & HEALTH, July-Aug. 1985, at 5, 6. "Social" case management provides
non-medical supportive services to well individuals (such as the elderly) to prevent a need for
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model, the patient chooses or is assigned to a particular primary
care provider, who then controls the patient's access to hospitals,
specialists, and most of the rest of the health care system. 13 The
primary care provider or "case manager" is given a direct financial
incentive to control costs, since in most plans the provider's income
will decrease if he or she approves expensive specialist or hospital
care. 14
The rapid adoption of the primary care case management
(PCCM) strategy by more than twenty state Medicaid programs"5
presents a moment of some opportunity and great peril for the poor.
The opportunity lies in the fact that under PCCM, the state Medi-
caid agency actually undertakes to enroll Medicaid patients with
particular physicians who have contractually promised to provide
them with adequate care as part of a prepaid, organized system. If
these arrangements are adequately funded and regulated, they could
overcome Medicaid patients' long-standing difficulties in finding
doctors who will accept them, improve the quality of care through a
variety of monitoring programs by professionals and patients, and
deter unnecessary costs. As a result, the political and financial via-
bility of publicly funded health care for the poor would probably be
strengthened. 6 The peril lies in the fact that PCCM, like all pre-
institutionalization. "Medical/social" case management supplies medical and non-medical
services to a population "already at risk," e.g., the elderly or the disabled children who need
provision and coordination of medical and non-medical care in order to be able to live in the
home or community. As discussed below, "primary care" case management, the subject of
this Article, focuses on a "gatekeeper" (almost always a physician) who provides primary
care and who controls access to the rest of the health care system. Id. at 6-7. See also
Somers, And Who Shall Be the Gatekeeper? The Role of the Primary Physician in the Health
Care Delivery System, 20 INQUIRY 301 (1983).
13. See, e-g., Somers, supra note 12, at 301, 303; Berenson, supra note 11, at 23-24; Spitz,
supra note 12, at 16; Iglehart, supra note 12, at 978; K. SQUARRELL, S. HANSEN & E. NEUS-
CHLER, PREPAID AND MANAGED CARE UNDER MEDICAID: CHARACTERISTICS OF CUR-
RENT INITIATIVES 4 (Oct. 1985) (National Governors' Association) [hereinafter cited as
SQUARRELL/NGA].
14. See sources cited supra note 13. Under these and other prepaid health plans, provid-
ers are said to be "at risk" for some of the costs of their patients' care.
15. According to Spitz, between 1981 and 1984, 18 state Medicaid programs initiated
"primary care networks" involving versions of primary care case management with over
350,000 Medicaid enrollees. In addition, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado established statewide
PCCM systems, and California, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and
Illinois embarked on "large-scale programs that employ alternative delivery systems." Spitz,
supra note 12, at 17; see also Iglehart, supra note 12, at 977-78; SQUARRELL/NGA, supra
note 13 (providing detailed descriptions of most state programs).
16. For discussions of the positive potential (as well as problems) of prepaid case man-
agement in Medicaid, see Gibson, supra note 12, at 75, 84-85, 100-01; D. FREUND, MEDI-
CAID REFORM: FOUR STUDIES IN CASE MANAGEMENT 5 (1984); Spitz, supra note 12, at 16;
Dallek & Wulsin, supra note 12, at 282-87. For more general arguments about the positive
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paid at-risk payment systems, creates a financial incentive to "con-
tain costs" and maximize provider income by denying adequate
care. If PCCM programs are inadequately funded and regulated,
they are likely to perpetuate and even worsen the dual-track tradi-
tion through "poor people's HMOs," characterized by significant
underservice, inadequate quality, and gross profiteering.17 As Ge-
raldine Dallek points out in this Symposium, such perils have al-
ready occurred, 8 and they highlight the special dangers of creating
financial incentives to deny care to the poor.19
This Article examines two sets of concepts and practices that
push in opposite directions with respect to the opportunity and the
peril. On one side stand a diverse set of concepts and practices that
I term the "patient-centered ideal." Part I of this Article explores
the expression of this ideal with particular reference to the poor in
medical ethics, malpractice law, the federal Medicaid statute, and in
concepts of market competition and democratic participation as ap-
plied to health policy. These themes are linked by a commitment to
the well-being and autonomy of patients, including low-income pa-
tients, on as equal a basis as possible and a commitment to making
these values operational in concrete policies and practices.
On the other side stand a set of concepts and practices that,
although difficult to name, clearly threaten the patient-centered
impact of health care competition on the poor, see A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 1, at 88-89,
139-40, 142; Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Serv-
ices, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 750 (1970).
17. See H. Luft, supra note 7, at 328-31; Schneider & Stem, Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 90, 126-38 (1975).
18. See Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium; see also Schneider & Stem, supra note
17, at 97-100; H. Luft, supra note 7, at 328-33.
19. See Ware, Rogers, Davies, Goldberg, Brook, Keeler, Sherbourne, Camp & New-
house, Comparison of Health Outcomes at a Health Maintenance Organization With Those of
Fee-For-Service Care, I LANCET 1017 (1986) [hereinafter cited as RAND HMO Study] (find-
ing that a prepaid group practice HMO produced lower costs and better health outcomes
than fee-for-service practice for "high income" at-risk enrollees (defined as patients in the
upper two-fifths of the income distribution with specified health problems) but produced
worse outcomes compared with fee-for-service practice for "low-income" at-risk enrollees
(defined as patients in the lowest fifth of the income distribution with specified health
problems)).
There are other perils to the poor inherent in the entire range of cost-containment pro-
grams. Prominent among them are: (1) tightened reimbursement to hospitals for most or all
patients, thereby eliminating budget surpluses that had been used to at least some extent to
finance care for the uninsured poor; and (2) reduced eligibility for Medicaid and other pub-
licly-financed health programs, thereby placing more people among the ranks of the unin-
sured. See Iglehart, supra note 1, at 59; Iglehart, Federal Policies and the Poor, 307 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 836, 840 (1982); Davis & Rowland, supra note 8, at 74 (estimating that post-
1981 state cutbacks in AFDC and Medicaid eligibility "could swell the ranks of the unin-
sured poor by over one million people").
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ideal. Part II of this Article explores how these threats have mani-
fested themselves in the federal legislative and administrative are-
nas. The detailed stories of legislative and administrative
developments suggest some defining characteristics of this "priva-
tization" perspective: a commitment to reduce the redistributive
and social-welfare role of the federal government and even of state
governments, to transfer that role to the greatest extent possible to
"private" (i.e., for-profit) entities under minimal public regulation,
and to avoid, as much as possible, the translation of patient-cen-
tered statutory provisions into concrete, operational policy.2' Part
III examines creative efforts at the state and local levels to go be-
yond the simple transfer of public functions to private entities and
to combine them constructively to grapple with the policy and ethi-
cal dilemmas of health care cost containment. Part IV briefly ex-
plores how the experience of Medicaid primary care case
management relates to broader debates about the politics of
privatization.
I. THE PATIENT-CENTERED IDEAL AND ITS APPLICATION TO
THE POOR
A. The Tensions in the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The doctor-patient relationship presents in extreme form the
general contradiction between individuals' need for mutual support
and cooperation and their fear of exploitation by those same others
from whom support is needed.21 Part of this tension is emotional:
the patient often wants to be cared for as a child by a benign parent
and is simultaneously threatened by this relationship.22 Another
part of the tension is economic, in that the patient's interest in the
most appropriate and affordable care may conflict with the doctor's
20. The concept of "privatization" is used in many different ways. See, eg., Starr, The
Meaning of Privatization, in PROJECT ON THE FEDERAL SOCIAL ROLE, WORKING PAPER 6:
PRIVATIZATION 1 (1985). As discussed in Part IV, the perspective referred to here corre-
sponds most closely with what Paul Starr terms "radical privatization," which "regards pub-
lic provision [of services] as a massive error or usurpation, requiring a drastic withdrawal of
government or reconstruction of property rights." Id. at 10. For overviews of the Reagan
administration's general privatization strategy with respect to health care, see Iglehart, Draw-
ing the Linesfor the Debate on Competition, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 291 (1981); Sidel, Health
Care: Privatization, Privilege, Pollution, and Profit, in WHAT REAGAN Is DOING TO Us 24
(A. Gartner, C. Greer & F. Riessman eds. 1982).
21. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 209,
211-13 (1979).
22. See, eg., J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 100-03 (1984).
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economic self-interest.23 This economic tension typically arises in
two forms: first, whether the doctor will enter into a relationship
with a patient who cannot pay the doctor's price; and second, once
the doctor-patient relationship has been established, whether differ-
ent methods of reimbursement may influence the doctor's recom-
mendations and decisions.
Although this Article necessarily touches on the first question,
its primary focus is on the second. If payment is on a fee-for-service
basis, then the doctor has an economic incentive to perform more
services, even when the benefits for the patient are unclear or are
less than the economic and personal costs.24 Conversely, if pay-
ment is based on a flat fee for a range of services or a bonus for
restricting access to more expensive services (as in some HMOs and
PCCM programs), the doctor has an economic incentive to perform
or authorize fewer services, even when the benefits to the patient
from additional services would justify the costs.25  This is not to
suggest that doctors' practice styles, including the rates at which
different procedures are done, are motivated solely by economics or
that doctors do not seek to promote their patients' well-being.
Rather, it reflects strong evidence that many doctors and hospitals
refuse to serve Medicaid and uninsured patients, presumably for
economic reasons,26 and that doctors' views on how to promote pa-
tients' well-being vary considerably, in part because of differences in
23. See, eg., Berenson, Capitation and Conflict of Interest, HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1986, at
141, 142-44.
24. See, eg., Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 749
(1985); Berenson, supra note 23, at 143-44; Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Qual-
ity/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 15-21, 25-28
(1975).
25. See, eg., Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 24, at 36-37; Berenson, supra note 23,
at 141; Relman, supra note 24, at 749.
26. With respect to doctors' refusal to serve Medicaid patients, see Mitchell & Crom-
well, supra note 7, at 106-20 (reporting that 23% of physicians nationwide refuse to see any
Medicaid patients and that the average physician devotes only 12.7% of his patient load to
Medicaid patients. These proportions vary greatly by geographic region and medical spe-
cialty.); Elias, Physicians Who Limit Their Office Practice To Insured And Paying Patients,
314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 391 (1986). With respect to hospitals' discharging or refusing to
admit patients for economic reasons (commonly referred to as "patient dumping"), see Schiff,
Ansell, Schlosser, Idris, Morrison & Whitman, Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective
Study of 467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986) (finding that 89% of transferred
patients were black or Hispanic, 87% were transferred because they lacked adequate medical
insurance, and many were in unstable condition at the time of transfer); Relman, Texas Elim-
inates Dumping: A Start Toward Equity in Hospital Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 578
(1986); Economic Considerations in Emergency Care: What Are Hospitals For?, 312 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 372 (1985); Wrenn, No Insurance, No Admission, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 373




Medical ethics and malpractice law have traditionally sought to
resolve these tensions by proclaiming the patient's benefit or well-
being as the central purpose and ideal of the doctor-patient relation-
ship." The following sections explore the expression of this pa-
tient-centered ideal in medical ethics, malpractice law, the federal
Medicaid statute, and in the theory of cost containment itself.
B. The Patient-Centered Ideal in Medical Ethics and Medical
Malpractice Law
Despite the rich diversity of traditions of medical ethics and the
absence of a single authoritative source, 9 "the core of professional
27. On the general issue of variation in physicians' views about appropriate care, see
infra text accompanying notes 72-77. It is widely believed that physicians' treatment deci-
sions are influenced by how they are paid. See, e.g., Blumenthal, Schlesinger, Drumheller &
the Harvard Medicare Project, Special Report: The Future of Medicare, 314 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 722, 726-27 (1986) (noting that Medicare's fee-for-service reimbursement of physicians
"creates a built-in incentive for physicians to provide more services," while Medicare's pro-
spective reimbursement of hospitals may lead "to a tendency to discharge older persons
'sicker and quicker.' "); Glaser, Controlling Costs Through Methods of Paying Doctors: Ex-
periences from Abroad, in POLICIES FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF HEALTH CARE COSTS AND
EXPENDITURES 209 (S. Schweitzer ed. 1978); Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical
and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, in this Symposium.
A dramatic example of differential treatment is presented in a recent study of over 65,000
deliveries in Brooklyn between 1977 and 1982 in which the authors conclude that private
physicians performed significantly more cesarean deliveries than "house officers" (residents)
caring for clinic patients. De Regt, Minkoff, Feldman & Schwarz, Relation of Private or
Clinic Care to the Cesarian Birth Rate, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 619 (1986). With controls for
medically significant factors (such as birth weight and diagnosis), private patients in some
categories were 2.48 times more likely to have a cesarean delivery than similarly situated
clinic patients. Id. at 620-21. Although the authors note that "convenience and financial
considerations" are possible explanations, they declare that "a more probable consideration is
physicians' concern about professional liability if there is an adverse outcome." Id. at 623
(noting that private obstetricians pay their own malpractice insurance premiums while resi-
dents do not). Why this factor is not itself a "financial consideration," and why it should
outrank income maximization, is not explained. But see McPherson, Wennberg, Hovind &
Clifford, Small-Area Variations in the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: An International
Comparison of New England, England, and Norway, 307 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1310 (1982)
(suggesting that geographical variations in seven common surgical procedures may not be
significantly influenced by reimbursement systems, because similar patterns of variations were
found in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway, despite differing organization
and financing of medical care).
28. See R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHIcS 22 (1981); Capron, supra note 27,
in this Symposium.
29. On the similarities and differences among the Hippocratic, Jewish, Catholic, Protes-
tant, and secular liberal traditions of medical ethics, see R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 3-49.
The multiple sources of "the folk ethic of the health professional," id. at 4, include the
AMA's Principles of Ethics and "the letters appearing in the national and state medical jour-
nals, the casual value messages passed from the clinical teacher standing at the bedside to
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physician ethics [is the commitment] to produc[e] good for [the]
patient and to protec[t] that patient from harm. ' 30 In the Hippo-
cratic tradition, the patient's best interests were determined by the
physician's own "ability and judgment, ' 31 with no participation by
the patient; indeed, Hippocrates advised physicians to "concea[l]
most things from the patient ... [and] revea[l] nothing of the pa-
tient's future or present condition. '3 2 Contemporary exponents of
medical ethics have reformulated traditional medical paternalism33
to include recognition of patient autonomy and self-determination
and have even called for a new kind of doctor-patient relationship
based on "mutual participation" and "shared decision making."'34
A plausible contemporary statement of these expanded ethical prin-
ciples can be found in what Professor Norman Daniels terms the
"ethic of agency," in which physicians' considerable clinical auton-
omy is in principle constrained by requirements that "clinical deci-
sions be competent, respectful of the patient's autonomy, respectful
of the other rights of the patient (e.g., confidentiality), free from
consideration of the physician's interests, and uninfluenced by judg-
ments about the patient's worth."35
The patient's ability to pay raises difficult questions with which
traditions of medical ethics have sought to deal through two distinc-
neophytes being initiated into the profession, [and] the apparently platitudinous preambles to
health policy debate ...." Id.
30. R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 22. See also Capron, supra note 27, in this
Symposium.
31. The Hippocratic Oath, in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF Bi-
OMEDICAL ETHICS 330 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS].
For an analysis of the Hippocratic tradition and its implication for modem cost containment
measures, see Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Reallocation of Resources, 16 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June 1986, at 32, 33-34; R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 22-26, 143-76.
32. 2 HIPPOCRATES, DECORUM 297 (W. Jones trans. 1967), cited in Katz, Limping Is
No Sin: Reflections on Making Health Care Decisions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 243 n.24 (1984).
Dr. Katz argues forcefully that this advice, and the principle of professional autonomy it
reflects, is still widely accepted by doctors in medical practice. See id. passim.
33. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOCHEMICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 36 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
34. Id.; see also Katz, supra note 32, at 243; R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 108-38.
35. Daniels, Why Saying No To Patients in the United States Is So Hard: Cost Contain-
ment, Justice, and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1986); See also
Mechanic, Therapeutic Relationship: Contemporary Sociological Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 668 (W. Reich ed. 1978). On the great difficulties of implementing these ide-
als, see Katz, supra note 32, at 247-48; R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 2, at 124-
50 (finding that physician-patient relationships are heavily influenced by patient's social sta-
tus); Roth, Some Contingencies of the Moral Evaluation and Control of Clientele: The Case of




tions. The first distinction is between the formation of the doctor-
patient relationship versus conduct within the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. American doctors have traditionally asserted the freedom
"to choose whom to serve, '36 presumably based in part on econom-
ics and qualified by at least some recognition of the need to provide
charitable care.37 Once the doctor-patient relationship is estab-
lished, however, that freedom to take economics into account disap-
pears, at least as a matter of principle. There is no explicit or even
implicit suggestion in any of the ethical traditions that doctors owe
less of a duty of fidelity and care to patients who cannot afford to
pay. Rather, ancient and modem ethical codes stress what seems to
be a unitary ideal: the doctors' duty is to act "for the benefit of the
sick;"'38 to provide "competent medical service with compassion
36. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA), Principles of Medical Ethics § VI
(1980), in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 332 [hereinafter cited as AMA
PRINCIPLES (1980)]; Principles of Medical Ethics § 5 (1957), in R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES
IN MEDICAL ETHICS 354 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AMA PRINCIPLES (1957)]; Principles of
Medical Ethics, ch.II § 4 (1955), in C. McFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 446, 451 (1946, 6th
ed., 1967) [hereinafter cited as AMA PRINCIPLES (1955)]. No date is cited for the copy of the
AMA PRINCIPLES reprinted in McFadden's MEDICAL ETHICS. However, on the basis of a
discussion with an AMA archivist, this version can be dated 1955. Telephone interview with
Marguerite Fallucco (Aug. 13, 1986).
37. Prior to 1957, the AMA PRINCIPLES contained an ethical duty to render charitable
care. See AMA PRINCIPLES (1955), ch. VII § 1, supra note 36, at 456 ("Poverty of a patient
... should command the gratuitous service of a physician .... ).
The 1955 Principles further stated that physicians "should be ever cognizant of the fact
that they are trustees of medical knowledge and skill and that they must dispense the benefits
of their special attainments in medicine to all who need them." Id, ch. I § 2, at 447. The
1957 revision of the AMA Principles eliminated the reference to gratuitous service, but stated
that the doctor's fee "should be commensurate with the services rendered and the patient's
ability to pay." AMA PRINCIPLES (1957) § 7, supra note 36, at 354.
The 1980 revision does not refer to charitable care and states simply that physicians shall,
"except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve." AMA PRINCIPLES (1980) § VI,
supra note 36, at 332. Nevertheless, some physicians continue to regard care for those unable
to pay as an ethical duty. See Elias, supra note 26, at 391 (criticizing fellow physicians who
refuse to see uninsured and Medicaid patients as "demean[ing] the individual physician and
cheapen[ing] the profession... [a]nd, most important .... depriv[ing] a large segment of our
fellow humans of care. Physicians who value their professionalism should treat office patients
on the basis of need, not remuneration."); Wrenn, supra note 26, at 373 (primary care inter-
nist in rural community describing refusal of a "well-endowed" university hospital to accept a
severely injured emergency patient on economic grounds and characterizing such refusal as a
betrayal of ethical principles).
On the other hand, many physicians reject such ethical concepts on economic or political
grounds. According to Mitchell and Cromwell, 23% of doctors nationwide refuse to accept
any Medicaid patients. This percentage rises to 36.8 in obstetrics/gynecology, 39.2 in cardi-
ology, 39.9 in psychiatry, and 40.0 in allergy. See Mitchell & Cromwell, supra note 7, at 107.
Reasons for nonparticipation in Medicaid considered "very important" by physicians include
inadequate fees (44.4%), payment delays (40.4%), administrative burdens (38% to 39%),
and "opposition to government in medicine" (38.8%). Id. at 117.
38. The Hippocratic Oath, in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 330.
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and respect for human dignity;"3 9 and to make "the health of my
patient ... my first consideration... [and] not permit considera-
tions of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing
to intervene between my duty and my patient."4 Contemporary
physicians and ethicists have been even more explicit: "physicians
are required to do everything that they believe may benefit each
patient without regard to costs or other societal considerations,"4
and any consideration of costs other than for the patient's own ben-
efit is seen as undermining the physician's "unequivocal commit-
ment to the patient."'42
These statements on the irrelevance of costs reflect a second im-
portant traditional distinction. While the patient's economic inter-
ests might be taken into account in making treatment decisions in
some circumstances,43 the doctor's economic interests are in theory
39. AMA PRINCIPLES (1980), supra note 36, at 331.
40. The World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (1948, as amended 1968), in
T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 331. Moreover, once the physician-pa-
tient relationship is formed, medical ethics require the doctor not to "withdraw from the case
without [adequate] notice to the patient to secure [alternative care]." AMA PRINCIPLES
(1955) ch. II § 4, supra note 36, at 451. See also AMA PRINCIPLES (1957) § 5, supra note 36,
at 354. The 1980 revision of the AMA PRINCIPLES does not refer to termination of care.
The American Hospital Association's (AHA's) "Patient's Bill of Rights" also prohibits dis-
continuance of hospital care without notice to the patient and arrangement for adequate al-
ternative care. See AHA, A Patient's Bill of Rights § 7, in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS,
supra note 31, at 336, 337.
41. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573 (1984).
42. R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 285. See also Morreim, Cost Containment: Issues of
Moral Conflict and Justice for Physicians, 6 THEORETICAL MED. 257, 259 (1985) (describing
the "traditional view"). However, there is evidence that this strong principle of patient-
centeredness regardless of cost may not be shared by many physicians. "A national sample of
primary care physicians were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following
statement: 'It is the responsibility of society, through its government, to provide everyone
with the best available medical care, whether he can afford it or not. . . .' Over one-half of
the physicians (53.5%) stated that they disagreed with this statement." Mitchell & Crom-
well, supra note 7, at 130 n.75. Unfortunately, Mitchell and Cromwell do not provide enough
details of this survey to permit evaluation of its significance. For example, the respondents
may have been disagreeing with that part of the question that placed responsibility for health
care on the "government," or they may have have disagreed that "the best available medical
care" (including advanced treatment involving very scarce resources) should be allocated
regardless of ability to pay. Either position still might be consistent with the traditional ethi-
cal ideal that the physician should not consider costs in his or her relationship with a particu-
lar patient.
43. A doctor is not ethically required to pay for hospitalization or drugs that a patient
cannot afford, nor to be insensitive to a patient's desire to avoid crushing debts far beyond his
or her ability to pay. Thus, in the absence of an adequate national health program, one can
infer that a patient's inability to pay may legitimately influence treatment decisions, presuma-
bly after full disclosure, informed consent, and efforts by the doctor to help arrange financial
assistance. According to one practicing physician and health policy analyst, "it has not been
unusual for me... to have to negotiate with Medicare patients over my recommended drug
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excluded from consideration. The pre-1957 American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) Principles tried to channel doctors' economic in-
terests into one economic model-fee-for-service practice -and to
discourage both entrepreneurial conflicts of interest45 and less costly
methods of payment.46 To be sure, under fee-for-service systems
doctors have always had a financial interest in providing excessive
services, but the ethical ideal is clear: physicians are "ethically
bound to place the medical care needs of their patients before their
own financial interests."'47 The same principle applies with even
greater force to cost-containment measures, under which the risks
of financial conflicts of interest are higher. Cost-containment meas-
ures can lead to unrevealed decisions against performing or recom-
mending services that are inherently very difficult for the patient to
detect.48
American medical malpractice law has generally followed the
medical profession's own views of patients' rights and physicians'
regimens in order to accommodate patients' very real budgetary constraints." Berenson,
supra note 11, at 22-23.
44. AMA PRINCIPLES (1955) ch. I § 6, supra note 36, at 449.
45. The pre-1957 Principles limited the sources of professionally-based income to "serv-
ices rendered the patient," id., thus implicitly condemning such modem practices as doctors
treating patients in hospitals, surgical centers or ambulatory care centers in which they have a
financial interest. See Relman, supra note 24, at 749. The pre-1957 Principles also explicitly
prohibited solicitation, advertising, fee-splitting, and the corporate practice of medicine.
AMA PRINCIPLES (1955) ch. 1 §§ 4 & 6; ch. VII § 5, supra note 36, at 448, 449, 457. "Cor-
porate practice of medicine" means arrangements whereby an institution or organization re-
alizes a profit from the practice of medicine.
46. Thus the pre-1957 Principles cast a somewhat dim eye on "contract practice," which
included payment by fee schedule, salary, or capitation. See id. at ch. VII § 3, at 456. Con-
tract practice was said not be to unethical per se but was declared unethical if it "permits of
features or conditions" considered unethical under the Principles, or "causes deterioration"
in the quality of care. Id.
47. Relman, supra note 24, at 750. Ethical practitioners may minimize the inherent
conflict of interest in the fee-for-service system by "avoiding self-referral whenever possible,
by conservative use of tests and procedures, and by conscientiously attempting to meet their
fiduciary responsibilities ...... Id These ideals may be reinforced by the fact or belief that
patients generally understand that doctors make money by delivering services, and that pa-
tients have at least the opportunity to question doctors' recommendations. Id. at 750; Beren-
son, supra note 11, at 143-44; Morreim, supra note 42, at 268.
48. The recently issued Ethics Manual of the American College of Physicians states that
"[the physician must avoid any personal commercial conflict of interest that might compro-
mise his loyalty and treatment of the patient." 101 ANN. INTERN. MED. 129 (1984), dis-
cussed in Relman, supra note 24, at 751. The AMA House of Delegates recently approved
physician profitsharing under fee-for-service reimbursement if disclosed in advance to the
patient and if consistent with proper care. It disapproved physician profitsharing under diag-
nostic-related group (DRG) reimbursement, a form of cost containment. House of Delegates
of the AMA, Conflict of Interest-guidelines; report of the Judicial Council of the AMA
(Dec. 1984), in Relman, supra note 24, at 750-51.
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duties.49 During the first half of the twentieth century, the doctor's
legal duty was to render competent care as measured by his or her
professional peers in his or her locality." Disclosure of more than
minimal information to the patient and other complex doctor-pa-
tient communications were not legally required because the medical
profession itself did not require them." But just as medical ethics
began to emphasize patient autonomy as an important ethical value,
so courts began in the late 1950's to emphasize informed consent as
a key means of patient self-determination. 2 The modem landmark
informed consent cases-such as Canterbury v. Spence53 and Cobbs
v. Grant5 4 - acknowledge the reality of choices within medical
decisionmaking and expand the concept of physician fidelity to
mean helping the patient make the crucial decisions.
Similarly, common and statutory law has largely followed pro-
fessional medical ethics on the relationship of financing to the stan-
dard of care. In most circumstances, a doctor has a legal right to
choose whom to serve and may reject a patient for economic rea-
sons.55 On the other hand, once a doctor-patient relationship has
49. A doctor's legal duty of care is typically defined as "that degree of care and skill
which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which he be-
longs, acting in the same or similar circumstances.... The standard should be established by
the medical profession itself and not by the lay courts .. " Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370,
373 (Ky. 1970); for qualifications and discussion, see J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 39-54 (2d ed. 1986); A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
44-45 (2d ed. 1978).
50. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549,
558-59 (1959).
51. See Katz, supra note 32, at 248-50; see also Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical
Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 33, at 14.
52. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957); 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 33, at 20-21. For a recent
argument that these and later cases have not adequately recognized a legal interest in patient
autonomy and that courts should recognize such an interest, see Shultz, From Informed Con-
sent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
53. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
54. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
55. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (physician may
refuse to enter into a contract with any patient, even one who has tendered a fee and needs
emergency care); Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (N.Y. Com. P1. 1891) (physician
may decline to respond to the call of a patient unable to compensate him) (dictum); Harper v.
Baptist Med. Center-Princeton, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976) (neither hospital nor doctor had a
duty to accept a patient who had no hospital insurance); 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons
§§ 48b, 52 (1951). Similarly, the federal Medicaid statute does not require physicians to
participate in the Medicaid program or to accept Medicaid patients. See discussion of the
"freedom of choice" provision, Social Security Act § 1902(a)(23), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)
(1982), infra note 60. On the other hand, a physician's relationship with a hospital may
require him or her to accept Medicaid and other low-income patients under certain circum-
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been formed, medical malpractice law, like medical ethics, has tra-
ditionally demanded a unitary standard of care. A New York trial
judge stated the point eloquently in 1891 in a jury charge:
Whether the patient be a pauper or a millionaire, whether he be
treated gratuitously or for reward, the physician owes him pre-
cisely the same measure of duty, and the same degree of skill and
care. He may decline to respond to the call of a patient unable to
compensate him; but if he undertake the treatment of such a pa-
tient, he cannot defeat a suit for malpractice, nor mitigate a re-
covery against him, upon the principle that the skill and care
required of a physician are proportioned to his expectation of
pecuniary recompense. Such a rule would be of the most mis-
chievous consequence; would make the health and life of the in-
digent the sport of reckless experiment and cruel indifference.56
The parallel between medical ethics and malpractice law was drawn
stances. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd) (hospitals that accept
Medicare reimbursement must comply with requirements regarding screening, stabilizing
treatment, and transfer with respect to all patients, regardless of whether eligible for Medi-
care; penalties for noncompliance include termination or suspension of Medicare provider
agreement, civil penalties, and damages and equitable relief for both patients and transferee
facilities); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 603-04, 688 P.2d 605,
610 (1984) (hospital has duty to provide "medically indicated" emergency care without con-
sideration of patient's economic circumstances); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D.
354 (E.D. La. 1972) (federal regulations require private nonprofit hospitals that have received
federal construction funds under the Hill-Burton Act to accept Medicaid patients), discussed
in Rosenblatt, note 64 infra, at 278-82; 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(c),(d) (1985) (hospitals that have
received federal Hill-Burton funds must make reimbursement arrangements, if eligible to do
so, with the Medicaid program, and must assure actual availability of physicians to Medicaid
patients).
56. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (N.Y. Com. P1. 1891). See also McCandless
v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 269 (1853) (surgeon is liable for improper treatment even to patient
attended gratis, "because [the surgeon's] situation implies skill in surgery"); DuBois v.
Decker, 130 N.Y. 325, 29 N.E. 313 (1891) (physician paid by city to attend patients in the
city almshouse owes patients the duty to exercise ordinary care and skill); Napier v.
Greenzweig, 256 F. 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1919); 48 C.J. Physicians & Surgeons § 106 (1929); 70
CJ.S. Physicians & Surgeons §§ 46, 52 (1951). The only reported case to suggest an alterna-
tive rule is Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 329 (1860). The Illinois Supreme Court stated that
"whenever a retainer is shown," a physician will be liable for injuries caused by want of skill
"which is ordinarily possessed by members of his profession," but "when the services are
rendered as a gratuity, gross negligence will alone create liability." IL at 330. (The physi-
cian in this case was represented by Abraham Lincoln and Elliott Herndon.) Six years later,
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed itself on this point, although it did not admit to doing so.
In McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111. 209 (1866), the court held that "[i]f a person holds himself out
to the public as a physician he must be held to ordinary care and skill in every case of which
he assumes the charge, whether in the particular case he has received fees or not." Id, at 210.
The court reconciled the Ritchey opinion with this rule by stating that the earlier case stood
for the proposition that if a person "does not profess to be a physician or to practice as such,
and is merely asked his advice as a friend or neighbor, he does not incur any professional
responsibility." Id.
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explicitly by the California Supreme Court in 1963 when it rejected
a hospital claim that charitable patients could be required to sign
exculpatory clauses waiving their rights to tort recovery. "To im-
munize the hospital from negligence as to the charitable patient be-
cause he does not pay would be as abhorrent to medical ethics as it
is to legal principle."57
C. The Patient-Centered Ideal and the Medicaid Program
For low-income patients, the ideal of patient-centeredness has
three important meanings: (1) access to care in spite of inability to
pay, (2) adequate quality of care once access is achieved, and
(3) equal respect for individual autonomy, including freedom to
choose providers and to make decisions based on informed consent.
Medicaid, the major federal and state health care program for the
poor, was enacted in 1965 with a commitment to overcome the
dual-track tradition and to achieve all of these goals. Open-ended
federal matching grants were supposed to induce the states to
broaden eligibility and services so that by the mid-1970's most low-
57. Tunkl v. Regents, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 103, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40, 383 P.2d 441, 448 (1963).
The one exception to the unitary standard of care was the doctrine of "charitable immunity"
for hospitals in their treatment of charitable patients, which dominated American hospital
law between 1876 and the early 1940's. For a comprehensive review and critique of the
doctrine and its justifications, see President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Charitable immunity protected hospitals from liability for the
acts of their employees, such as nurses or salaried physicians, who frequently had responsibil-
ity for services to the poor. Physicians in private practice--often termed "attending physi-
cians"-did not receive salaries from hospitals and were not considered hospital employees.
Hospitals were typically not liable for such physicians' negligence, because the doctrine of
respondeat superior did not apply to the hospital-doctor relationship. See, eg., Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
Some courts attempted to justify the charitable immunity doctrine on the implied contract
grounds that the charitable patient had implicitly "waived" his or her right to legal protec-
tion from negligence in return for free care. See, eg., Hughes, 130 F.2d at 826. In the 1940's
and 1950's courts increasingly rejected this ground, noting that the waiver was often entirely
fictional (e.g., with infants or unconscious patients), that it was almost never announced as
hospital policy, that it was not within the normal expectation of patients, and that no patient
would voluntarily agree to it. Id. Not surprisingly, when some hospitals then required pa-
tients to sign exculpatory clauses as a condition of admission, courts refused to enforce them
on the grounds that the clauses were contracts of adhesion and represented an effort to revive
by contract the abandoned doctrine of charitable immunity. See Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 102-03,
32 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40, 383 P.2d at 447-48. Similar reasoning has invalidated releases from
future negligence sought by physicians. See, e.g., Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn.
1977); Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968).
The perceived crisis with respect to medical malpractice insurance, and the growing influ-
ence of market-oriented approaches to law and public policy, has led to a new generation of
proposals to allow modification of malpractice standards by contracts between providers and
patients. See, e.g., Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort Law Dogma: Market Opportunities
and Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spr. 1986, at 143.
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income patients would be eligible for comprehensive public health
insurance.5 8 Like medical ethics and medical malpractice law, the
Medicaid program contemplated that the services provided to low-
income patients would be "of high quality and in no way inferior to
that enjoyed by the rest of the population."5 9 In addition, a 1967
amendment to the original statute explicitly rejected the dual-track
tradition of restricting low-income patients to special public institu-
tions and charitable providers, and established Medicaid patients'
right to freedom of choice of any qualified provider who agreed to
supply services.6°
Medicaid's original strategy for achieving these ambitious goals
was simple: to provide reimbursement so that low-income patients
could buy their way into an otherwise unchanged mainstream
health care system. This strategy succeeded in part, as low-income
patients dramatically increased their use of hospitals and doctors
between 1965 and 1975.61 On the other hand, it quickly became
58. See Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 649. The original Medicaid statute required the
states to broaden the scope of eligibility and services. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
§ 121, 79 Stat. 286, 350 (1965). This provision was repealed by the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 230, 86 Stat. 1329, 1410 (1972).
59. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW), Handbook of Public Assistance
Adm'n, Supplement D, § D-5140.
60. See Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 227, 81 Stat. 821, 903 (1967) (adding § 1902(a)(23) to the
Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1982)). The significance of this
provision has been multi-faceted. When enacted in 1967, it probably represented both a safe-
guard against restricted care for the poor and protection for providers against restricted (and
perhaps more efficient) contract purchasing by the state agencies. Thus the House Ways and
Means Committee explained that this provision was designed to give Medicaid recipients
"freedom in their choice of medical institution or medical practitioner," a freedom "charac-
teristic of our medical care system." H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1967).
The provision did not, however, require providers to serve Medicaid patients, nor did it re-
quire the states to set rates of payment that would induce providers to serve them. See id.
The Senate modified the House provision to include community pharmacies and drugs
among the providers and services with respect to which free choice was assured. S. CONF.
REP. No. 1030, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3179, 3211; see also Social
Security Amendments of 1967, Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1867 (1967) (statement of Dr. William S. Apple, Exec. Dir. of the
American Pharmaceutical Ass'n). Similarly, clinical laboratories used the provision in an
effort to block New York City from centralizing the purchase of laboratory services in the
Medicaid program. See Bay Ridge Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc. v. Dumpson, 400 F. Supp.
1104 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
On the other hand, from the mid-1970's to the present the freedom of choice provision
has functioned less as a protection for providers and more as a major statutory (and political)
protection for Medicaid recipients against mandatory (and often ill-conceived) at-risk con-
tracting and PCCM. See infra notes 115-34 and accompanying text.
61. Prior to 1965, the poor received substantially less care from doctors than the
nonpoor, although their health needs were significantly greater. See K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN,
supra note 6, at 26-48. For example, in 1964, children under age 15 from high-income fami-
lies earning over $10,000 per year averaged 5.1 physician visits per year, 89% higher than the
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apparent that this approach was very expensive and ineffective
against deep-seated access barriers such as racial discrimination,
lack of health care resources in rural areas, and relocation of physi-
cians and hospitals to affluent areas.62 Moreover, the structure of
the Medicaid program was ambiguously balanced between state dis-
cretionary authority and mandatory federal requirements. As pro-
gram costs increased sharply from the late 1960's,63 states used
their discretionary authority to restrict eligibility, services, and re-
imbursement.' These restrictive measures enlarged the number of
uninsured, deterred the provision of excluded services, and made
the Medicaid program less attractive to physicians, thereby under-
cutting access to quality care and effective freedom of choice.6
2.7 visits per year for children from low-income families earning under $4,000 per year. Id
at 41-42. With respect to all ages, high-income families averaged 5.1 physician visits per year,
19% higher than the 4.3 visits for low-income families. Id. During this same period, low-
income children had far higher rates of chronic conditions with and without limitation of
major activity than high-income children. See H. LuFr, POVERTY AND HEALTH 69-70
(1978) ("children" being defined as under 17, "low-income" as under $2,000 per year, and
"high-income" as over $7,000 per year). Low-income children remain at much greater risk of
low birth weight, infant mortality, and birth defects. See K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note
6, at 34-35. Similar differences in health status remain true for adults. Id. at 35-40. By 1975
the utilization pattern had changed, with physician visits and hospitalization for the poor
reaching and surpassing the levels for the nonpoor. These changes have been characterized
as "really monumental achievements." Rogers, Blendon & Moloney, Who Needs Medicaid?,
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 13, 15 (1982); see also K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note 6, at 40-
48.
62. On the issue of expense, see infra note 63. On the issue of nonfinancial barriers, see
K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note 6, at 71-83. The interaction of racial attitudes and
pressures for suburban relocation are the subject of NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Center, 491
F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
63. The size, sources, and significance of rising Medicaid expenditures are matters of
some controversy. Raw dollar figures are dramatic. From FY 1973 to FY 1979, national
federal and state Medicaid spending rose from $8.5 billion to $20.3 billion-an average an-
nual compound percentage increase of 15.59%. R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra note 6,
at 4-5. But much of this increase can be explained by the general inflation in health care
prices over which Medicaid had no control. Id. at 13-16; see Davidson, Cromwell & Schur-
man, Medicaid Myths: Trends in Medicaid Expenditures and the Prospects for Reform, 10 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 699, 700-01 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Medicaid Myths]. In-
deed, Medicaid's increase in constant dollars between 1973 and 1979 (42.3%) compares very
favorably with much higher constant dollar increases in Medicare and health care spending
as a whole. See R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra note 6, at 16. For conflicting discus-
sions of whether Medicaid expenditures loom large in state budgets, compare id. at 3 with
Medicaid Myths, supra, at 701-08. Moreover, with the exception of expanded intermediate
care coverage, the number of enrollees and services covered actually declined from 1973 to
1979, further emphasizing the role of prices as the major cause of growth in spending. See R.
BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra note 6, at 13; Medicaid Myths, supra, at 711-12, 715-21.
64. See R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 6; K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note 6,
at 87-89; Blake, supra note 7; Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A
Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 294-95 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Mitchell & Cromwell, supra note 7 (documenting low physician participa-
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Despite these developments, the patient-centered ideal of wide-
spread access to high-quality care remained an important political
and legal principle in the Medicaid program. 6 Even when enacting
cutbacks, federal and state officials have usually proclaimed fidelity
to the principles of access and quality, and have justified restrictions
as improvements in efficiency or as temporary measures necessi-
tated by immediate budget constraints. 67  Moreover, at various
times, complex coalitions of political leaders, providers, and Medi-
caid recipients and their advocates have resisted the pressures to-
ward inferior care and have sought to implement the patient-
centered aspects of the program. 8 A major example of this phe-
nomenon occurred during congressional consideration of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), where efforts were
made to reconcile innovative cost-containment techniques such as
PCCM with the original goals of access to quality care.
D. The Patient-Centered Ideal and the Theory
of Cost Containment
The physician's ethical duty of fidelity to the patient requires
that recommendations and decisions be made on the basis of the
patient's medical interests, rather than on the basis of the economic
interests of the doctor, insurance company, or society at large.6 9 In
contrast, all cost-containment measures attempt to link the physi-
cian's decision to consciousness of economic scarcity, whether
through out-of-pocket charges to the patient, practice norms set by
tion rates in Medicaid); H. LuFr, supra note 7, at 323 (noting impact of eligibility restrictions
and low benefits). On the impact of more recent restrictions, see Blendon, Aiken, Freeman,
Kirkman-Liff & Murphy, Uncompensated Care By Hospitals or Public Insurance for the Poor
Does It Make a Difference?, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1160 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Blen-
don] (documenting major access barriers for low-income patients not covered by Medicaid);
Iglehart, Cutting Costs of Health Care for the Poor in California, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745
(1984); Lurie, Ward, Shapiro & Brook, Termination from Medi-Cal-Does It Affect Health?,
311 NEw ENG. I. MED. 480, 484 (1984) (215 medically indigent patients terminated from
Medi-Cal (the Medicaid program in California) in 1982 found after six months to have "sig-
nificant deterioration in... access to care, satisfaction with care, and health status.")
66. For discussion of court decisions blocking proposed state Medicaid cutbacks, see
Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 294-303.
67. See Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 294; R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra note 6, at
6, 17-20.
68. Prominent examples include the long struggles by Medicaid recipients and their al-
lies to implement the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) pro-
gram, and the consumer protection provisions of the Medicaid statute regarding HMO
enrollment and other at-risk contracting. On the former, see, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 2,
at 655-57; on the latter, see infra notes 113-19, 197-99, 217-34 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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insurers or other entities, or financial incentives to the doctor.7 °
For this reason, cost-containment measures are often perceived as
being inconsistent with the patient-centered ethical ideal. On the
other hand, three relatively new perspectives on health policy-geo-
graphic variations research, market competition, and democratic
participation-have the potential to help reconcile cost-contain-
ment goals with the patient-centered ideal.
Beginning in the early 1970's, pathbreaking research by Dr.
John Wennberg and other analysts demonstrated large variations by
geographic location in rates of hospitalization, surgery, and other
medical procedures, without differences in rates of illness. 72 To
take one dramatic example, "a child living in Rumford, Maine, has
fifteen times the probability of being hospitalized with a diagnosis of
pediatric pneumonia as does a child living in Portland. ' 73 Lack of
professional consensus and outcome data make it impossible at
present to say which of the varying utilization rates are "right," but
the low rates do not involve obvious underservice or low quality of
care and may represent the better pattern.74 Reliance on the judg-
ments of individual doctors-which tend to cluster by locality or
region7 - - about patients' best interests is thus often inadequate
70. For discussion of various cost-containment strategies, see Rosenblatt, Health Care,
Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1073-88 (1981); Marmor, Boyer &
Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1981); Beren-
son, supra note 11, at 22-23.
71. See, eg., Levinsky, supra note 41, at 1573-75; R. VEATCH, supra note 28, at 285;
Morreim, supra note 42, at 259; Capron, supra note 27, in this Symposium.
72. See, eg., Caper, Variations in Medical Practice: Implications for Health Policy, 3
HEALTH Asu., Summer 1984, at 110; Wennberg, Which Rate Is Right?, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 310 (1986).
73. Caper, supra note 72, at 113-14. These variations are found in hospital admission
rates for more than 80% of medical conditions. See Wennberg, supra note 72, at 310. The
variations are correlated with the number of available hospital beds per capita (i.e., more beds
are correlated with higher rates of hospitalization), the "practice styles" of physicians in a
particular area, and lack of physician consensus regarding appropriate treatment. Id.
74. See Wennberg, supra note 72, at 311 (noting low-use patterns of medical admissions
in Iowa City, Palo Alto, and New Haven, "where university hospitals provide high-quality
care." Dr. Wennberg suggests that "agreement might well be reached to reduce the use of
hospitals for high-variation medical conditions."). Moreover, when doctors have been in-
formed of high variations in procedures (such as tonsillectomies in Vermont and hysterecto-
mies in Saskatchewan), doctors with high rates have lowered their rates dramatically. See
Knox, The Many Faces of Health Care, Boston Globe, Aug. 20, 1984, at 44.
75. Practice patterns can be observed within regions or localities because doctors do not
practice idiosyncratically; rather, they "tend to follow what is considered standard and ac-
cepted in the community." Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty,
3 HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 74, 86. This tendency arises because of pervasive uncer-
tainty in medical diagnosis and treatment. Given this uncertainty, there is "'safety in num-
bers.' A physician who follows the practices of his or her colleagues is safe from criticism,
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without more careful analysis of practice styles and conscious
choices among them. Consumers could and should participate in
making these choices,76 for example, by being members of boards
attached to HMO and PCCM projects.77  Cost-containment pro-
grams that foster patient participation of this sort may redefine and
strengthen the patient-centered ideal.
Also beginning in the early 1970's, analysts such as Paul Ell-
wood, Clark Havighurst, and Alain Enthoven argued that health
care cost containment should be severed from its roots in regulation
and collectivist consumerism78 and linked to the ostensibly more
free from having to explain his or her actions, and defended by the concurrence of col-
leagues." Id The community standard in turn derives from such diverse sources as state-
ments in national journals and textbooks, opinions of established physicians, new ideas
brought in by new physicians, and incentives provided by reimbursement systems and mal-
practice law. The latter two factors have, until very recently, strongly pushed for increased
services and expenditures. Id at 86, 85. Differences between community standards exist "be-
cause not enough is known to establish which opinion is correct." Id. at 86. Few procedures
and incentives exist to compare various practice standards and to attempt to reach a more
defensible and general consensus.
76. According to Dr. Wennberg, geographic variations research "tells me that there is a
lot of choice for the patient. We need to know what those choices imply. We need to find out
which of these practice patterns we would prefer as patients." Knox, supra note 74, at 44.
77. Federal law requires HMOs seeking federal qualification to have one-third of their
policymaking bodies be members (i.e., enrolled consumers) of the HMO, with "equitable
representation" of members from medically underserved populations served by the HMO.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(5)(A)(i), (ii), & § 300e-l(3). (For a critique of the adequacy of this
provision, see Schneider & Stern, supra note 17, at 104 n.66.) Some state laws contain similar
provisions; see, eg., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1557 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Given lack of
support by society and by most HMOs themselves, the effectiveness of such consumer partici-
pation remains unknown. See H. LuFr, supra note 7, at 348-51. On consumer participation
in Medicaid PCCM programs, see discussion infra at notes 219-33.
78. Prior to the 1970's, health care cost containment had taken two primary forms
which have continued, with important modifications, to the present: (1) regulation by gov-
ernment and quasi-government agencies, and (2) alternatives to fee-for-service reimburse-
ment, typically known as "prepaid group practices." On regulatory efforts such as utilization
review, see J. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 33-51
(1977); S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 115-44 (2d ed. 1976); on health plan-
ning, see, eg., Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 304-10; Morone & Marmor, Representing Con-
sumer Interests: The Case of American Health Planning, in T. MARMOR, POLITICAL
ANALYSIS AND AMERICAN MEDICAL CARE 76 (1983). Without strong federal leadership
and appropriate financial incentives, it quickly became apparent that these regulatory efforts
would have little impact on costs. See, eg., in addition to sources cited above, Brown, Tech-
nocratic Corporatism and Administrative Reform in Medicare, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
LAW 579-90 (1985).
Beginning around the turn of the twentieth century and expanding in the 1920's and
1930's, prepaid plans were sponsored by employers, unions, and consumer co-ops. See P.
STARR, supra note 2, at 200-03, 301-06, 320-27. They were often non-profit in form and
reflected a desire for rational, planned, collective organization at odds with the individualistic
rhetoric (and monopolistic reality) of organized medicine. See, eg., Note, The Role of Pre-
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effective force of market competition.7 9 The goal of this perspective
is not simply to reduce health care expenditures, but rather to give
"reasonable individuals what they want and only what they want, in
the sense that, understanding the alternatives, they would purchase
it for themselves assuming their income was not below a certain
level, perhaps the median in the population." 8 Under this model,
competitive "intermediaries" or "gatekeepers," such as health
plans, insurance companies, or doctors at financial risk, decide
through a market with consumers which types of health care are
worth their cost.8 1 The primary protection for patients against un-
reasonable underservice is said to be market competition.82 In prac-
tice, middle-class HMO consumers have relied on a complex mix of
protective devices, including individual market freedom (i.e., dis-
enrollment), collective bargaining and influence through employers
and unions, internal grievance mechanisms and quality assurance
programs, federal83 and state84 regulation, malpractice law," and a
culture of professional norms and consumer expectations that work
to deter unethical and exploitative behavior. These competitive and
regulatory mechanisms, together with the fruits of geographic vari-
paid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 902-18
(1971).
79. See, eg, A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 1, at 93-113; Havighurst, supra note 16, at 739-
59.
80. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 24, at 15-16.
81. For analysis of and references to these proposals, see Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at
1074-78.
82. Thus, according to Enthoven, if "every family has a free and fair choice among
competing health plans, organizations that make a practice of underserving their members
will not last long." A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 1, at 69.
83. See Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq.; 42 C.F.R. § 110 (1985).
84. See, eg., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1551-1567 (Purdon Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 2J-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1986); Schneider, Model Consumer Health Mainte-
nance Organization Act and Commentary, 6 Rtrr.-CAM. L.J. 266, 267-70 (1974).
85. On the general issue of applying malpractice law to HMOs, see Bovbjerg, The Medi-
cal Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375.
However, the impact of malpractice law may be diminished by HMO policies, notably in
California, requiring binding arbitration as a condition of enrollment. See Note, Medical
Malpractice Arbitration: Time for a Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454, 466 (1981); Mad-
den v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal.3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976) (en
banc) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claims entered into between state
retirement board on behalf of state employees and prepaid health care provider); Stevens,
Medical Malpractice: Some Implications of Contract and Arbitration in HMOs, in HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: MILLBANK READER 5, at 414 (J. McKinlay ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS]. In addition to malpractice
law, HMOs may become subject to the doctrine of "bad faith breach of contract" tradition-
ally applied to insurance companies. See Stern, Will Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract Be
Extended to Health Maintenance Organizations?, I 1 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 12 (1983).
[Vol. 36:915
POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION
ations research and other data, could constitute a new and ex-
panded "patient-centered ideal.",1
6
Achieving Enthoven's version of this ideal would still require
substantial government action, particularly for the poor. The key
step in Enthoven's strategy is the government's supplying low-in-
come persons with an income-related subsidy "large enough to en-
able them to purchase membership in a good quality comprehensive
health care plan.... "87 In addition, the government would try to
assure actual availability of plans to low-income and high-risk pa-
tients by regulating the scope of services covered, premiums, out-of-
pocket expenses, information disclosure, and open-enrollment peri-
ods.88 Starting in the mid-1970's, Congress and the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), the federal Medicaid agency,
attempted a version of this strategy by urging the states to contract
with mainstream, federally certified HMOs that also served middle-
class patients and to encourage Medicaid recipients to enroll in
those HMOs.89 Such HMOs are widely thought to deliver better
and less costly care than that provided by fee-for-service doctors,
particularly those who serve Medicaid patients. However, progress
remains slow in most states, primarily because many HMOs con-
sider the capitation rates offered by Medicaid inadequate in light of
the anticipated costs of marketing, Medicaid eligibility turnover,
and treatment of patients often regarded as "high risk."9 0
86. See Lohr, in this Symposium. For discussion of reasons why the market competi-
tion approach may be incapable of achieving this ideal, see Rosenblatt, supra note 70; Arras,
The Neoconservative Health Strategy, in IN SEARCH OF EQUITY 125 (R. Bayer, A. Caplan &
N. Daniels eds. 1983) and ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 532 (J. Arras & R. Hunt
eds. 2d ed. 1983).
87. A. ENTHoVEN, supra note 1, at 81.
88. See id. at 126-30. The extent of these suggested regulations indicates the inventive-
ness of prepaid plans in avoiding patients who are perceived to be bad financial risks. Re-
quired and "government-supervised" annual open enrollment periods are necessary to give
low-income and high-risk patients a realistic enrollment opportunity. Enthoven does not
address, however, the most effective HMO exclusionary policy-filling existing capacity with
desired patients and declining to expand, particularly into areas accessible to low-income
patients.
Community rating-charging the same premium to persons in the same "actuarial cate-
gory" based on gross characteristics such as age and family size-is needed to avoid pricing
high-risk patients out of the market. Service coverage must be regulated to prevent inade-
quate undercoverage, deceptive advertising, and exclusionary overcoverage, i.e. offering only
a very expensive benefit package to deter lower-income patients. Information disclosure and
other marketing practices must be regulated to generate understandable contracts and to
avoid deceptive practices.
89. See, eg., Luft, Assessing the Evidence on HMO Performance, in HEALTH MAINTE-
NANCE ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 85, at 212, 233; H. LuFr, supra note 7, at 323-28.
90. See, eg., Luft, supra note 89, at 234; H. LuFr, supra note 7, at 323-41; Veit, Health
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Compared with the well-funded and highly visible market com-
petition approach, the concept of democratic participation presently
has a quasi-fugitive existence in the world of health policy. Never-
theless, it has made major contributions to the patient-centered
ideal. The basic premise of this approach is that patients or con-
sumers of health care should be directly represented in the institu-
tions that make health policy and particularly in the institutions
engaged in health care cost containment. Indeed, federal and state
laws and regulations currently require such representation on local
and state health planning boards,91 Medicaid advisory commit-
tees, 92 and the boards of directors of Blue Cross/Blue Shield93 and
HMOs.94 Such representation has often been co-opted and ineffec-
tive, because few social resources have been devoted to building and
sustaining an independent consumer presence in the arena of health
policy.91 However, the few existing resources--organized senior
citizens, consumer advocates such as the Health Research Group
founded by Ralph Nader, public interest law firms, legal services
programs, welfare rights groups, and other advocates in the field of
social services-have supported important contributions to health
policy in general and to PCCM policy in particular.96 Indeed, ana-
Maintenance Organizations and Medicaid, in AMBULATORY CARE: PROBLEMS OF COST
AND ACCESS 147 (S. Altman, J. Lion & J. Williams eds. 1983). The initial reluctance of
established HMOs to participate in the Arizona AHCCCS project, infra notes 165-80, was
reportedly based on similar concerns. See J. CHRISTIANSON & D. HILLMAN, HEALTH CARE
FOR THE INDIGENT AND COMPETITIVE CONTRACTS: THE ARIZONA EXPERIENCE 116
(1986) (noting that established HMO facilities were geographically located so as to be attrac-
tive to employed groups; a commitment to serve large numbers of indigents would require
investment in new facilities and staff, and "could reduce their attractiveness to private em-
ployed groups.").
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 3001-(b)(3)(C)(i) (1982) discussed in Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at
304-30.
92. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.12 (1985), discussed (under prior numbering) in Rosenblatt,
supra note 64, at 290-98.
93. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 48-5 (West 1985); S. LAW, supra note 78, at 26-
30, 171-73.
94. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1557 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
95. See Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 297, 304-36; S. LAW, supra note 78, at 26-30, 171-
73; Sparer, Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the Poor Today, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sparer, Gordian Knots]. On the more
general relationship of law and movements for social change, see Sparer, Fundamental
Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Criti-
cal Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 560-74 (1984).
96. On the contributions made by legal services programs, public interest law firms, and
organized low-income consumers to health care policy in the Hill-Burton, Medicaid, and
health planning programs, see Rosenblatt, supra note 64; on the contributions of such groups
and advocates to Medicaid PCCM, see infra text accompanying notes 219-33. (For a con-
trary argument, with which I disagree, on why such efforts were not a "contribution" to the
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lysts of the PCCM experience at the local level tend to agree that
constructive involvement of Medicaid recipients and their advocates
in policymaking and implementation is essential to program
success.
E. Three Themes of the Patient-Centered Ideal
Three themes common to the diverse sources discussed above
are particularly relevant. First, all the versions of the patient-cen-
tered ideal profess that the patient's well-being and autonomy
should be a central, perhaps preeminent factor in the doctor-patient
relationship and in the making of health policy. Second, all the ver-
sions of the patient-centered ideal recognize a connection between
reimbursement and coverage decisions and the dynamics of the doc-
tor-patient relationship. Third, all the versions seek to "operation-
alize" the patient-centered ideal, either by saying what that ideal
requires in different contexts (as do medical ethics and malpractice
law) or by establishing a process through which patients and their
representatives can give concrete meaning to the ideal (as do market
competition and democratic participation). All of these versions
and their competing sub-versions can be criticized in conception
and implementation. But their shared virtues become clearer when
they are confronted with a perspective denying their common
premises.
II. MEDICAID PRIMARY CARE CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE
THREAT TO THE PATIENT-CENTERED IDEAL
The general tension between PCCM and patient-centered health
care for all patients is magnified with respect to the poor. The pro-
tective factors upon which middle-class HMO patients rely-such
as purchasing power, freedom to disenroll, capacity to press griev-
ances, access to malpractice law, and a culture of non-exploitative
norms and expectations-operate much less effectively for Medicaid
patients.97 Moreover, the dependence of the poor on government
action has led to additional political and administrative threats to
the patient-centered ideal.
Hill-Burton program, see Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as
a Case Study, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1227, 1231-38 (1984)). On the contributions of organized
senior citizens and other consumer groups to the market approach to health care, see Lohr,
supra note 86, in this Symposium.
97. See, eg., Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium; Arras, supra note 86, at 541;
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REv.
1401, 1412-16 (1981).
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A. The Politics of Medicaid Cost Containment
Medicaid cutbacks before 1981 had restricted but not eliminated
the fundamental principle of open-ended entitlement. Under that
principle, Medicaid recipients are entitled to defined services for
which the federal and state governments will pay allowed costs
without any fixed upper limit on overall expenditures. 98 The Rea-
gan administration arrived in Washington in 1981 with more ambi-
tious plans and a more far-reaching philosophy. At the most
fundamental level, the administration sought not simply to restrict
domestic expenditures or to improve program efficiency, but further
to eliminate or to reduce sharply major welfare and redistributive
functions of the federal government, particularly those embodied in
the most politically vulnerable open-ended entitlement programs
such as Medicaid.9 9 The most radical strategy for accomplishing
this goal, embodied in the 1980 Gephardt-Stockman bill, was to re-
peal the Medicaid program and most health regulatory programs
entirely and to give low-income persons vouchers to purchase
health insurance through private insurers." ° Although by no
98. See supra text accompanying note 67.
99. See, eg., Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Pro-
gram, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1984); Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-1; Gorham, Overview, in
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REvIsrrED 1, 5-6 (D. Bawden ed. 1984). Former Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) Director David Stockman's appreciative description of then-Con-
gressman Phil Gramm captures the spirit of some of the officials involved in making
Medicaid policy:
Gramm understood fully that high marginal tax rates were but one manifestation of
the welfare state problem. Down in the briar patch of the budget and regulatory
agencies, hundreds of similar policy errors demanded correction. He could rip
through the alleged facts and mythical rationalizations which support little sink-
holes of waste such as physicians' training subsidies or big ones like open-ended
Medicaid reimbursement .... In his mind, as in mine, the first principles of the
anti-statist revolution were complementary. They required an enormous shrinkage
of the vast expenditures that the Congress pumped into illicit and inappropriate
functions of the state. That permitted lower taxes. Capitalist dynamism also re-
quired lower taxes. That necessitated far less spending.
D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 52 (1986). Stockman is correct that "open-
ended Medicaid reimbursement," particularly cost-based reimbursement for hospitals, is in-
flationary and wasteful. However, he does not explain why solutions less harmful to vulnera-
ble patients (such as changing the hospital reimbursement system) are not available, nor why
the poor should be among the first to bear the burden of cost containment, when the bulk of
health care cost inflation is caused by cost-based reimbursement from Medicare and private
insurance. See supra note 63. More fundamentally, Stockman does not attempt to justify his
apparent assertion that financing medical care for the poor is an "illicit and inappropriate
function" of the federal government (and perhaps of any government).
100. See H.R. 7527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), also introduced as H.R. 850, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For discussion of this bill and of David Stockman's views on health
policy, see Iglehart, supra note 20.
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means relinquishing this policy goal,1"' the administration also pro-
posed in 1981 a fixed limit or "cap" on federal Medicaid spending
increases of five percent for FY 1982, to be adjusted thereafter by
the rate of inflation as measured by the gross national product
(GNP) deflator."0 2 Such a change in the basic structure of Medi-
caid would have two profound and intended effects. First, it would
eliminate health needs-however inadequately measured-as the
policy and budgetary center of the program and would substitute a
budgetary ceiling determined by general budgetary politics, includ-
ing the demands of budget balancing and the military. 10 3 Second,
because the federal cap was set to rise much more slowly than the
projected fifteen percent per year increase in Medicaid expenditures,
the states would have received much less federal money than under
the existing system, estimated at $1.2 billion less in FY 1982 and $5
billion less by FY 1984.1" In return, the states were to be given
unprecedented discretion to limit the kind or scope of services of-
fered, to restrict eligibility, and to alter the terms and amount of
reimbursement. 0 5 Since most of the states were themselves pressed
by economic recession, budgetary deficits, and strong taxpayer
resistance, it was likely that the Medicaid program would have been
reduced in ways that seriously threatened any pretense of patient-
centered medical care for the poor.
Federal officials who adopt this perspective typically continue to
refer to access and quality as program ideals10 6 but simultaneously
101. See Pear, White House Urges Cash Welfare Aid, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1986, at 1,
col. 1 (White House officials "quietly encouraging state welfare officials to make proposals"
that would "consolidat[e] social welfare programs and substitut[e] a single monthly cash pay-
ment or check for food, medical and housing assistance, day care, employment and training
programs and other social services.").
102. See Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-2; Wing, supra note 99, at 40.
103. See Wing, supra note 99, at 29-34, 37-42. On more general proposals of this sort, see
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care Through Market Mechanisms: A Response to
Professor Blumstein, 60 TEx. L. REv. 919, 922 (1982).
104. See Wing, supra note 99, at 40. Depending on various estimates of the gap between
actual Medicaid expenditures and the federal budget inflation factor, Wing states that the
administration's proposal might have resulted in "a 30% to 40% reduction in the Medicaid
program funding by 1985." IM2 at 40-41. Even if the state governments had managed to
resist reductions of this magnitude, there seems little doubt that the admininstration's pro-
posed cap would have "vastly increased pressures on states to cut their programs," while at
the same time giving them wide discretion to do so. See R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra
note 6, at 8, 63.
105. See Wing, supra note 99, at 40; R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN, supra note 6, at 63.
106. See, eg., Anderson, The Objectives of the Reagan Administration's Social Welfare
Policy, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REvIsrrED, supra note 99, at 15 (on the Reagan domestic
program generally); S. 1377, § 724(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 135-40; Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) testimony regard-
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insist on fast budget savings and minimally regulated state and pri-
vate administration of Medicaid. 107 Achieving these latter two
goals-quick budget savings and unregulated administration-
would usually be inhibited by serious attention to access and qual-
ity. The Reagan administration's approach thus also implies a ju-
risprudence: a lack of enforceable federal duties concerning access
and quality on the part of federal and state agency officials and
health care providers, and a lack of rights and remedies for
patients. 108
On the issue of the federal cap the administration suffered one of
its few budget defeats at the hands of a coalition composed of Con-
gressional liberals, the National Governors' Association, counties,
mayors, and groups working for the interests of children, senior citi-
zens, women, the institutionalized, and public and teaching hospi-
tals.109 Pressed by these advocates and interests, Congress rejected
the Medicaid cap in favor of a more complex system of federal re-
ductions that the states could recover if they met stated cost-con-
tainment goals. 110 On the issue of federal program requirements, a
compromise emerged which in principle rejected the administra-
tion's proposal for virtually unregulated state administration and
which retained a significant federal administrative role.' But de-
spite these two legislative setbacks, the administration neither
changed its policy goals nor lost its opportunities to further them
through executive action." 2
ing the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS), infra text accompanying
note 166. For similar expressions of benign intentions during earlier periods of cost cutting,
see Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 294 & n.230 (quoting 1972 views of Senate Finance Commit-
tee and its then-chairman, Senator Long).
107. See, eg., Eizenstat, Comments (on Anderson, supra note 106), in THE SOCIAL CON-
TRACT REViSrrED, supra note 99, at 28 (on the Reagan domestic program generally); discus-
sion of Reagan administration's 1981 proposals regarding Medicaid, supra text accompanying
notes 98-105; discussion of HCFA implementation of Medicaid PCCM and the AHCCCS
program, infra text accompanying notes 150-203; Dallek, supra note 2 in this Symposium.
108. For discussion of why certain statutory provisions regarding access and quality
passed by the Senate would probably have been unenforceable, see infra text accompanying
notes 135-40. For an effort to justify lack of enforceable rights and duties in terms of market
theory and judicial doctrine, see Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional,
Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345, 1354-85 (1981); for a similar argument
based on legislative history and statutory interpretation, see Blumstein, supra note 96, at
1227. For a critique of these arguments, see Rosenblatt, supra note 97, at 1417; Rosenblatt,
supra note 103, at 920; Rosenblatt, supra note 64.
109. See Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-21.
110. See Wing, supra note 99, at 49-50. A detailed account of the legislative politics is
provided in Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-19 to 2-36.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 113-49.
112. On the administration's continuing commitment to radical restructuring of Medi-
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B. The Statutory Basis of PCCM
Prior to 1981, states wishing to implement PCCM or other at-
risk health care faced two major restrictions in the federal Medicaid
statute. The first were restrictions on state Medicaid contracts with
"at-risk" providers such as HMOs, embodied in section 1903(m) of
the Social Security Act.113 Under this provision, states were per-
mitted to enroll Medicaid recipients in prepaid, capitated health
plans only if Medicare and Medicaid enrollment did not exceed fifty
percent of the total enrollment and if the plans were federally quali-
fied HMOs or were based at federally funded community health
centers.114 The IMO restrictions had been developed in response
to unregulated Medicaid contracting with prepaid health plans in
caid through vouchers or cash benefits, see Pear, supra note 101. For examples of continued
legislative and executive struggle over Medicaid policy, see the discussion of waiver adminis-
tration, at-risk contracting, and health insuring organizations (HIOs) infra text accompany-
ing notes 150-203. In addition to the obvious avenues of influence through formal executive
department policies and appointments, the White House and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) have apparently played a role in particular health policy issues such as the
Medicaid waiver program in Arizona, discussed infra text accompanying notes 165-80. See
Medicaid Issues Management of Arizona Medicaid Waiver: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce [hereinafter
cited as Medicaid Issues], 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 203-04 (1984) (testimony of Michael Zimmer-
man, Assoc. Dir., Human Resources Div., United States General Accounting Office (GAO))
[hereinafter cited as Zimmerman/GAO testimony] (acknowledging White House policy sup-
port for "testing competition and market force in the health area" but denying any "political
interference" or "compromise" of the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA)
"professional judgment"); ki at 234-41 (colloquy between Congressman Sikorski and Patrice
Feinstein, HCFA Assoc. Admr. for Policy, regarding OMB role in HCFA decisions regard-
ing Medicaid waivers). See also J. CHRiSTiA1sON & D. HILLMAN, supra note 90, at 70, 71
(discussing OMB and White House role in approval of AHCCCS waiver); Health Financing:
Medicaid Community Care Waiver: Hearing Before the Subcomin. on Health and the Envi-
ronment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. Ist Sess. 65, 65-67, 202-
310 (1985) (detailing OMB involvement in Medicaid waivers under Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 2176, 95 Stat. 812 (1981), adding § 1915(c) to the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n(c) (1982)).
113. Social Security Act § 1903(m), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m) (1980), added to the Social
Security Act by the Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-460,
§ 202(a), 90 Stat. 1957 (1976).
114. See Social Security Act §§ 1903(m)(2)(A)(iii), (l)(A)(iii), and (2)(B) (1976), 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(2)(A)(iii), (1)(A)(iii), and (2)(B) (1976) (embodying the 50% rule, the
federal qualification requirement, and the exceptions for federally funded community health
centers and certain other entities respectively). The numerous requirements for "federal
qualification" of HMOs, set out in 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1976), include restrictions on sub-con-
tracting, requirement of consumer representation on the policymaking board, availability of a
grievance procedure, maintenance of community rating, and provision of health education
and health maintenance information to each member. See Mullen & Schneider, The Health
Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976: Implications for the Poor, HEALTH L. PRO-
JECT LIB. BULL., Jan. 1977, at 1, 6; see also SQUARRELL/NGA, supra note 13, at 3 (discuss-
ing the pre-1981 provisions of § 1903(m)).
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California in the early 1970's, under then-Governor Reagan, which
had resulted in serious underservice, misrepresentation, and profi-
teering.' 15 The second was the Medicaid recipient's right to free-
dom of choice of any qualified provider who agreed to supply
services, embodied in section 1902(a)(23) of the Social Security
Act. 16 The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
(and continues to have) authority under section 1115 of the Social
Security Act" 7 to waive these requirements to enable the states to
carry out demonstration projects. Relatively few states had pursued
such projects before 1981, perhaps because they required a formal
research design and evaluation." 8 Taken together, the provisions
on at-risk contracting and freedom of choice insured that Medicaid
recipients could only be offered voluntary enrollment in plans that
also served privately insured patients and that met federal regula-
tory standards."19
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) 20 in-
volved a complex legislative struggle over at-risk contracting, free-
dom of choice, and the extent of the federal administrative role.
The Republican-controlled Senate, supporting much but not all of
the administration's proposals,' 2 ' passed a bill repealing section
115. See, eg., S. REP. No. 749, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 & passim (1978); Prepaid
Health Plans: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm.
on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 335 & passim (1976) (testimony of Mr.
David Vienna); Mullen & Schneider, supra note 114, at 5. For additional discussion of the
problems with unregulated Medicaid at-risk contracting in California, and analysis of the
relevant pre-1976 provisions of federal and state law, see Schneider & Stern, supra note 17.
116. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(23), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (1982), discussed supra
note 60.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1982).
118. Section 1115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1982) authorizes the Secretary of HHS to
waive "[a]ny of the requirements of section... 1396a" and to include as expenditures costs
otherwise excludable under § 1396b, including the at-risk contracting requirements. Accord-
ing to a House Committee Report, waivers under § 1115 can be granted only in order to test
a "unique" approach to delivery and financing of Medicaid services, combined with a detailed
research methodology and comprehensive evaluation. See H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 307 (1981); cf 45 C.F.R. § 282.41 (1985) (requiring evaluation of demonstration
projects); SQUARRELL/NGA, supra note 13, at 2; but see Crane v. Matthews, 417 F. Supp.
532 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that Secretary of HHS has broad discretion to grant waivers
under § 1115). Extensive discussion of and materials concerning HHS's standards and proce-
dures with respect to § 1115 waivers can be found in Medicaid Issues, supra note 112.
119. However, relatively few such plans were interested in participation. See supra text
accompanying note 90.
120. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
121. See Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-19 to 2-20 (noting that the Republican Senate sup-
ported the administration proposal for a firm limit on federal Medicaid expenditures and for
nearly unfettered discretion at the state level, but raised the five percent cap to nine percent,
included some protections for pregnant women and children, and sought significant budget
[Vol. 36:915
POLITICS OF PRIVATIZTION
1903(m), which would have given the states unregulated discretion
to engage in at-risk contracting, including establishment of Medi-
caid-only at-risk health plans.122 In contrast, the Democratic-con-
trolled House of Representatives' bill amended section 1903(m) to
give the states somewhat greater flexibility by raising the Medi-
care/Medicaid enrollment ceiling from fifty to seventy-five per-
cent 123 and to increase protections for patients by adding provisions
regarding financial solvency, nondiscrimination on the basis of
health status, and voluntary disenrollment by patients. 24 The Con-
ference Committee rejected the Senate's attempt to repeal section
1903(m) and accepted the House bill with one major modification.
This modification allowed the states to contract with plans that
were not federally qualified HMOs if they met certain requirements
as to accessibility of services and financial solvency.1
2 1
However, the struggle over at-risk contracting occurred not
only on the logical battleground of section 1903(m), but also around
the freedom-of-choice provision, section 1902(a)(23). Here, too, the
Senate bill in effect provided for total repeal,"2 6 while the House bill
authorized the Secretary of HIIS to waive the freedom-of-choice
(and certain other) provisions (but not the at-risk contracting re-
quirements of section 1903(m)), to enable the states to establish case
management systems. 127 Again, the Conference Committee re-
jected the Senate bill and appeared to adopt the House approach
with minor modifications.' 28 However, the text of the law as en-
acted-known as section 1915(b) of the Social Security Act 12 9 -au-
thorized the Secretary to waive the requirements of both section
savings from Medicare, despite the fact that the administration had exempted Medicare from
budget cuts).
122. S. 1377, § 724(b), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see also S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 476-77, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 396, 743.
123. See H.R. 3982, § 6330(a)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REc. 14,356, 14,413
(1981).
124. H.R. 3982, § 6330(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 14,356, 14,413 (1981).
125. See HoUSE CONF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 968-69 (1981), reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvS 1010, 1330-31.
126. The Senate bill would have permitted the states to restrict recipients' choice of
health care providers as long as the restrictive arrangements were cost-effective, based upon
reasonable payments, and assured that recipients had "reasonable access to services" through
providers who met "all applicable [state] standards." S. 1377, § 724(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); see also S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 476-77, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 396, 742-43. For discussion of why the apparent protections for pa-
tients were unlikely to be effective, see infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
127. H.R. 3982, § 6326(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 14,356, 14,411 (1981).
128. See HousE CONF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 964 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1010, 1326.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1982).
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1902 (which includes the freedom-of-choice provision) and section
1903(m) (the HMO contracting provision) as may be necessary to
implement a case management system. 130  The Secretary now had
the authority to accomplish by waiver what the Senate had at-
tempted to achieve by statutory amendment: a grant of authority to
the states to mandatorily assign Medicaid recipients to at-risk
health plans without the protections of section 1903(m). In the next
session's Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982"'
(TEFRA), Congress quickly deleted the Secretary's authority to
waive the provisions of section 1903(m), 132 explaining that it had
been "an erroneous statutory reference."' 133 However, HHS contin-
ued to circumvent the section 1903(m) requirements until 1986
through the concept of a "health insuring organization" (I-IO).' 31
The struggle between the Senate and the House concerning the
degree of federal control over state Medicaid programs involved not
only substantive requirements, but also differing conceptions of the
federal administrative role. The Senate bill repealing patient free-
dom of choice, for example, required state programs restricting
choice to assure that Medicaid recipients "have reasonable access to
services [through providers] which meet all applicable standards
under the State plan .. . ."' Enforcing this provision, however,
would have been very difficult. Aside from the discretionary na-
130. OBRA, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175(b), 95 Stat. 357, 810, adding § 1915(b) to the
Social Security Act. This section also permitted waivers of federal requirements to allow a
locality to act as a "central broker" in assisting recipients in selecting among competing
health plans, to share with recipients cost savings from more cost-effective care through pro-
vision of additional services, and to restrict recipients to particular cost-effective providers.
Other subsections of § 1915 permit, inter alia, the states to engage in competitive bidding for
laboratory services, § 1915(a)(1)(B); to restrict recipients who have abused the program
through unnecessary use to particular providers, § 1915(a)(2)(A); and to suspend providers
who have abused the program by providing unnecessary services or below-quality care,
§ 1915(a)(2)(B).
131. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
132. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 137(b)(19)(A), 96 Stat. 324, 380. Thus, after August 1982, the Secretary of HHS could
waive only the freedom-of-choice requirement and certain other provisions of § 1902 to en-
able states to establish case management programs.
133. H.R. REP. No. 757, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982). The report of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce further stated that "[i]t was never the intent of the [1981]
Conferees to authorize" the waiver of the at-risk contracting requirements. Id. at 16. The
Conference Report accepted the House position on § 1903(m), subject to "grandfathering in"
those waivers that were in effect prior to August 10, 1982. HousE CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 440, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1220.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 181-99.
135. S. 1377, § 724(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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ture13 6 and inadequate remedies137 of federal administrative en-
forcement, the Senate bill did not require the Secretary of HHS to
develop any operational standards, or to gather any data, concern-
ing "reasonable access" to care through PCCM and other cost-con-
tainment programs. 138 Thus even an HHS Secretary inclined to
enforce these requirements-or a Medicaid recipient seeking judi-
cial enforcement directly against a state agencyg13 -would have
faced great difficulties in defining the applicable legal standard and
proving a violation."4
Unlike the Senate bill, which permitted states to implement
mandatory cost-containment programs and put the burden of moni-
toring and challenging them on providers and recipients, the House
bill, as explained by the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, 4 ' required the states "to document the cost-effective-
ness and program impact of their desired changes" to HHS before
implementing their programs. 42 In considering state waiver re-
quests, the House Committee intended the Secretary's broadened
waiver authority "only [to] be used to approve waivers that assure
that access to care is maintained or improved for Medicaid benefi-
136. See Arthur C. Logan Memorial Hosp. v. Toia, 441 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
137. See id. at 27 ("The Secretary can withhold payment or he can negotiate with a State.
He cannot compel compliance [with federal law].").
138. The Senate bill also addressed quality and access by requiring state programs limit-
ing recipient freedom of choice to provide for "reasonable payment based upon comparison of
costs at which services of proper quality may be obtained and are actually available . 5.." S.
1377, § 724(a). Again, however, HHS was not required to develop standards or data to make
enforcement feasible. Moreover, the bill provided that recipients be assured reasonable access
to "providers which meet all applicable standards under the State plan .... Id This provi-
sion in effect delegated the quality issue to the states themselves.
139. See, eg., Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed in Rosen-
blatt, supra note 64, at 290-91.
140. For analogous problems encountered by low-income patients seeking to enforce the
Hill-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o
(1982), see Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Found., No. 725-71, slip op.
(D.D.C. June 28, 1972), discussed in Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 273-76.
141. The Medicaid program, and most other federal health financing and services pro-
grams except the hospitalization part (Part A) of Medicare, are under the substantive juris-
diction of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by John Dingell of
Michigan, and its Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, chaired by Henry Waxman
of California. Omenn, supra note 12, at 2-19. Under the congressional budget process, the
House Budget Committee sets overall spending goals but permits the substantive committees
and subcommittees to allocate the specified amounts within programs and to draft the rele-
vant budget legislation and reports. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGREs-
SIONAL BUDGET PROcEss: A GENERAL EXPLANATION 15 (Comm. Print 1986).
142. H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1981). The House bill did "stream-
line" the pre-1981 waiver process. Id. For discussion of waiver standards under Social Se-
curity Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1982), seesupra note 118.
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ciaries. 143 The House bill, particularly in light of the House Com-
mittee Report accompanying it, thus relied significantly on federal
administrative enforcement to reconcile cost containment with the
access and quality goals of patient-centered care.
The waiver provision as finally enacted-section 1915(b) of the
Social Security Act-was in most respects a strengthened version of
the House bill. The House Committee's emphasis on maintaining
access to and quality of care was transferred from the committee
report to the statute itself, so that in reviewing waivers the Secretary
was now to consider not only whether care was cost-effective and
efficient, 1" but also whether the waiver proposal would "substan-
tially impair access to . . . [medical] services of adequate quality
where medically necessary."14 Moreover, the Secretary was di-
rected to "monitor the implementation of waivers... to assure that
the requirements ... are being met .... 146 Congress's legislative
intent, as expressed in the statute and legislative history, was thus
reasonably clear: the Secretary of HHS was to play a significant
role in protecting the goals of access and quality. At the same time,
the long history of federal nonenforcement of Medicaid require-
ments on behalf of recipients 4 7 and the preferred policies of the
Reagan administration1 4 1 suggested that the waiver authority could
and would pose a significant threat to the patient-centered ideal.149
143. H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1981). The House Committee Report
also stated that "while the Committee appreciates the need for States to realize economies in
their Medicaid programs and desires, through waivers... to accord States with the flexibility
to make such economies, the Committee is greatly concerned that such waivers are not to be
used to substantially impair access to care for all recipients. Access to quality health care
services that are sufficient in amount to meet genuine needs of all recipients should be main-
tained and services should be available from providers that are sufficient in number and loca-
tion so as to be reasonably accessible to all recipients." Id. at 311.
144. Social Security Act § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1982). Under this section, the
Secretary must also find the waiver to be "not inconsistent with the purposes of this sub-
chapter [the Medicaid statute]." Id. For judicial interpretation of a similar statutory provi-
sion granting the Secretary broad discretion, see California Welfare Rights Org. v.
Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
145. Social Security Act § 1915(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b)(1) (1982).
146. Social Security Act § 1915(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(e)(1) (1982).
147. See, eg., Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 286-303; R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra
note 6.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 99-112.
149. In this context, one can distinguish between legislative intent as to what should oc-
cur, embodied in the text and legislative history of the statute, and political expectations
about what is likely to occur. According to Gilbert Omenn, Dean of the University of Wash-
ington School of Public Health & Community Medicine, and a close analyst of OBRA's
legislative history, Congressman Henry Waxman, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, proposed
the waiver provision "to bring ... state changes into the open, to buy time for assessment of
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C. The Administration of Medicaid Waivers for PCCM
Federal regulation of the waiver process depends on the mean-
ing given to the key terms in section 1915(b): "cost-effective and
efficient"' 0 and "substantially impair access" to services of "ade-
quate quality."'' These terms were virtually undefined in the stat-
ute or legislative history,'52 thereby placing great responsibilities on
the Secretary of HHS, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) (the component of HHS responsible for Medicaid) and the
state Medicaid agencies. Given the history of at-risk contracting in
Medicaid," 3 the innovative nature of the enterprise, and the general
tension between PCCM's financial incentives and the patient-cen-
tered ideal,' 5 4 protection of access and quality depends on careful
definition of the crucial regulatory terms and on clear operational
standards for implementing them. Similar issues arise in HCFA's
administration of demonstration project waivers under section
1115, which contains even less guidance in its statutory text and
legislative history.55
With respect to section 1915(b), HCFA issued "interim final
regulations" in October 1981156 and final regulations in May
1983.' s The agency stated its general approach to its waiver-ap-
proval role as trying
to afford States the greatest possible flexibility and opportunity
proposals in the affected states as well as by the Health Care Financing Administration, and
to build a record from which state actions could be evaluated later." Omenn, supra note 12,
at 2-29.
150. Social Security Act § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1982).
151. Id. at § 1396n(b)(1).
152. The one partial exception is "access." The Senate bill referred to "reasonable access
to services (taking into account geographic location and reasonable traveltime) ... ." S. 1377,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 724(a) (1981). The House Committee Report referred to "the availa-
bility of services during reasonable time periods and within reasonable geographic distance of
the residence of the Medicaid beneficiaries." H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 308
(1981).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15; Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
155. Section 1115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) gives the Secretary authority to waive any re-
quirement of § 1396a "to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to enable" a state to
carry out a "demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist
in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid statute]." This provision was enacted by the
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (1962),
before the enactment of Medicaid itself. Its legislative history simply repeats the statutory
terms. See S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1961-62. The references to the Medicaid statute were added by the Social
Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 87-97, § 121(c)(3), 79 Stat. 286, 352 (1965).
156. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,524 (1981).
157. See 48 Fed. Reg. 23,212 (1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431).
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for innovation . . . consistent with the statutory requirements.
We have therefore decided to minimize federal prescription of
definitions and procedures ... [and] do not intend ... to compel
[states] to meet unnecessary burdensome regulatory require-
ments .... Instead, we will permit each State to determine its
own program content and administration, consistent with the
law. We will impose no requirements or criteria for waiver ap-
proval or compliance beyond those specified in the statute. 
158
At first glance, these statements may appear to be reasonable ad-
ministrative implementation of a Congressional compromise about
the degree of state discretion. The text of the regulations reveal,
however, that what HCFA means is that many of its regulations
will simply repeat verbatim the literal statutory terms.1 5 9 The regu-
lations do require a state agency seeking a waiver to "document in
the waiver request and maintain data regarding [cost effectiveness,
the] effect on recipients regarding access to care and quality of serv-
ices, [and] the projected impact of the program."16 "Cost effective-
ness" and "efficiency" are defined simply as "reducing costs or
slowing the rate of increase and maximizing outputs or outcomes
per unit of cost," '161 while "substantially impair access" and "ade-
quate quality" are not defined at all, despite public requests for clar-
ification.16 2 HCFA thus left itself free to decide on a case-by-case
basis, without clear standards, whether a state waiver request was
"consistent with the statutory requirements."' 63 HCFA pursued a
similar policy with respect to section 1115 waivers by issuing no
Medicaid regulations."6
158. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,524 (1981).
159. Thus both the interim and final rules simply repeat the statutory clause that a Medi-
caid recipient's choice of provider may be restricted under a PCCM waiver "provided that
[those] restrictions do not substantially impair access to [medical care] services of adequate
quality where medically necessary." 42 C.F.R. § 431.55(c), reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg. 48,528
(1981) and 48 Fed. Reg. 23,222 (1983). Indeed, HCFA itself noted that the "regulations
merely restate the statute .... " 48 Fed. Reg. 23,215 (1983).
160. 42 C.F.R. § 431.55(b)(2) (1985).
161. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.55(f)(2) (1985).
162. See 48 Fed. Reg. 23,215, 23,218 (1983) (refusal by HHS, in response to public com-
ments on interim final regulations, to provide more detailed guidance and definitions, to pro-
mulgate performance standards, or to regulate the qualifications of case managers).
163. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,524 (1981); 48 Fed. Reg. 23,212 (1983). See also 48 Fed. Reg.
23,215 (1983) (refusal by HHS to promulgate performance standards); UNITED STATES
DEvT. OF HHS, HEALTH CARE FIN. ADM'N. (HCFA), STATE MEDICAID MANUAL § 2108
(1985) [hereinafter cited as STATE MEDICAL MANUAL] (noting that HCFA "evaluates
waiver requests on a State-by-State basis ... ").
164. See Medicaid Issues, supra note 112, at 245 (letter from Patrice Feinstein, Associate
Administrator for Policy, HCFA, to Congressman Henry Waxman (Aug. 10, 1984), stating
that "[there are no regulations which govern the section 1115 waiver review and approval
process."); for internal HCFA materials on § 1115 waivers, see id. at 325-47. The only HHS
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HCFA's conception of its regulatory role under the waiver stat-
utes is most clearly documented with respect to one of the largest
and most ambitious projects, the Arizona Health Care Cost Con-
tainment System (AHCCCS). Before 1982, Arizona was the only
state to have no Medicaid program at all, relying on "free care"
public hospitals and clinics with many of the characteristics of the
traditional dual-track system to provide health care to 380,000 resi-
dents with incomes below the poverty line.1 65 Seeking, in the words
of a HCFA associate administrator, "to avoid the perverse incen-
tives [of an open-ended fee-for-service system] ... and provide high
quality care to the poor in a cost-effective manner," Arizona re-
ceived a section 1115 waiver in July 1982 to establish a statewide
prepaid PCCM system in which providers would competitively bid
for local contracts under the administration of a for-profit contrac-
tor.166 Beginning operations in October 1982, by March of 1984
AHCCCS had enrolled about 85,000 Medicaid recipients, 16,000
federally-covered Indians, and 60,000 low-income patients financed
entirely by the state, at a projected total cost through September
1984 of $284.2 million, of which the federal share was $176.3
million. 1
67
To implement this massive and, in the words of Governor Bab-
bitt, "radical experiment," 168 both Arizona and HCFA turned to
regulations on § 1115 waivers concern demonstration projects for recipients under the AFDC
program. See 45 C.F.R. § 282 (1985).
165. The pre-1982 Arizona system included seven state and county acute care general
hospitals, 20 state and county primary care clinics, and 39 non-profit community hospitals
that together provided uncompensated care worth approximately $55 million. See Blendon,
supra note 65, at 1161. Blendon and his colleagues report that Arizona's pre-1982 system
was characterized by significant underservice and financial barriers to care; for example, low-
income Arizona children had 40% fewer visits to a physician than low-income children in the
rest of the United States, even though the health status of the two groups was comparable.
Similarly, low-income Arizona residents were twice as likely to report refusal of care for
financial reasons than their counterparts in other states. See id. at 1162-63. County residence
requirements for free hospital care, another characteristic of the traditional dual-track sys-
tem, were declared unconstitutional in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974). Additional material on the pre-1982 Arizona system can be found in J. CHRISTIAN-
SON & D. HILLMAN, supra note 90, at 14-23.
166. Medicaid Issues, supra note 112, at 222-24 (testimony of Patrice Feinstein, Associate
Administrator for Policy, HCFA) [hereinafter cited as Feinstein/HCFA testimony]. De-
scriptions and analyses of the AHCCCS program can be found in J. CHRISTIANSON & D.
HILLMAN, supra note 90; Brecher, Medicaid Comes to Arizona: A First Year Report on
AHCCCS, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 411, 415 (1984); Babbitt & Rose, Building A Better
Mousetrap: Health Care Reform and the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 243, 263
(1986).
167. Id at 161-62 (background information prepared by subcommittee staff).
168. Id at 165 (statement of Governor Brace Babbitt) [hereinafter cited as Babbitt
testimony].
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the private sector with a strong belief in the capacity of competitive
bidding and for-profit management to achieve access, quality, and
cost-containment goals.' 69 The state and HCFA sought what Gov-
ernor Babbitt termed a "turnkey contract to the private sector,"' 7 °
i.e., a contract with a private, for-profit entity that would enable the
state to simply "turn the key" and walk away from the Medicaid
program. The result was, in Governor Babbitt's words, a manage-
rial "nightmare," and the state resumed administration of the pro-
gram in May 1984.111 Governor Babbitt's June 1984 testimony to
the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment was that
"my advice to this committee, to HCFA, . . . lesson No. 1" is to
move slowly and incrementally in setting up demonstrations, and
avoid "turnkey contracts" with the private sector. 7
HCFA's administration of the access and quality components of
the AHCCCS project are of particular interest. According to the
General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation, "[d]elivering qual-
ity and appropriate care" was a "primary objective" of the project,
and HCFA required that contracting providers develop written
quality assurance plans, that the state check and analyze detailed
utilization data, that the state and providers establish beneficiary
grievance procedures, and that the state conduct medical audits.'73
Yet by May 1984-twenty months after startup of the project-
virtually none of these quality assurance mechanisms were function-
ing properly. The GAO concluded that "neither HCFA nor the
State has adequate information to be assured that quality and ap-
propriate care is being provided."' 17 4
Despite the absence of utilization data, HCFA and Arizona
maintained, on the basis of a consumer satisfaction survey and a
medical review carried out in late 1983, that AHCCCS patients
"were receiving care at least as good as that received by private
patients in the same plans." '75 But the GAO reported that one of
HCFA's own medical advisors, who evaluated the medical review
process relied on by HCFA and the state, found that the quality of
care reflected in the medical records was "generally substan-
169. See id. at 181 (Babbitt testimony); Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium; Brecher,
supra note 166, at 415, 420; Babbitt & Rose, supra note 166, at 263; J. CHRISTIANSON & D.
HILLMAN, supra note 90, at 33.
170. Medicaid Issues, supra note 112, at 181, 166 (Babbitt testimony).
171. Id at 163 (staff background), 166 (Babbitt testimony).
172. Id. at 181 (Babbitt testimony).
173. See id. at 187 (Zimmerman/GAO testimony).
174. Id. at 187 (Zimmerman/GAO testimony); see also id. at 199-219.
175. Id. at 228 (Feinstein/HCFA testimony), 175 (Babbitt testimony).
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dard;' ' 17 6 that the reviewing physicians were inclined to understate
their findings, in part because the reviewing physicians believed that
"these are less desirable places to practice medicine and it is not
realistic to expect top practitioners to reside there;'"' 77 that the re-
viewing physicians had been allowed only one-eighth of the time
normally spent for medical review of less problematic providers;1 78
and that the review criteria were very general, not quantified, and
did not evaluate the reasonableness or correctness of diagnosis. 79
For all of these reasons, the quality and appropriateness of care
under AHCCCS remained a sharply disputed question. A second
medical audit, carried out in August and September 1984, improved
the systematic quality of the review and led to "the correction of
several areas of deficiency on a program-wide basis."1 0
Against this background, it is remarkable that one of HCFA's
major policy initiatives in the Medicaid waiver area between 1982
and 1986 involved encouraging the states to turn over large parts of
their Medicaid administration to private, at-risk contractors under
programs designed to exempt them from what the House Subcom-
mittee termed the "minimal" at-risk contracting protections of sec-
tion 1903(m). 18 1 Although Congress had twice indicated its intent
to maintain those protections---once during the 1981 passage of
OBRA and again in the 1982 enactment of TEFRA' 82 -HCFA be-
gan actively to promote the concept of the "Health Insuring Organ-
ization" (HIO) as a way to avoid them. As originally conceived, an
HIO is like a fiscal intermediary-such as Blue Cross or a commer-
cial insurance company-that contracts with a state Medicaid
agency to process and pay providers' bills under the fee-for-service
system. Unlike an intermediary, however, the HIO is paid on an at-
risk capitation basis. It receives a fee for each enrollee and takes a
176. Problems noted by the HCFA Chief Medical Advisor included "numerous [medical
history] notes lacking any physical examination;" lack of continuity of care (e.g., diagnostic
tests ordered in one visit ignored in the next); and "reluctance to refer to specialists when
patients failed to respond to treatment (e.g., a ten month old infant who had more than eight
sequential ear infections, a body weight of 14 pounds and no referral for specialist pediatric
evaluation)." Memorandum from Arnold Milstein, M.D., Chief Medical Advisor, HCFA, to
John O'Hara, Associate Regional Administrator, Program Operations (Oct. 19, 1983), re-
printed in Medicaid Issues, supra note 112, at 218 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 218. The reviewing physicians also stated that "attenuation of critical com-
ments was essential to gaining necessary provider cooperation .... " Id.
178. See id at 218.
179. See id at 219.
180. Bostrom & Rafferty, Quality of Care Under AHCCCS, 143 WEST. . MED. 6, 7
(Supp. 1985).
181. H.R. REP. No. 757, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 127-34.
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risk of loss or gain depending on the level of provider costs. 183 Be-
cause under this model an HIO does not "provide" medical care,
but only "pays" for it, HCFA took the position that HIOs were
exempt from all the contracting and patient protection require-
ments of section 1903(m). 184 After Congress eliminated the Secre-
tary's authority under section 1915(b) to waive the section 1903(m)
protections, 18' HCFA invited the states to structure their section
1915(b) waiver requests in the form of HIOs and thereby achieve
the same result of largely unregulated at-risk contracting between
the state and the HIO, as well as less internal control by the HIO of
its subcontracting providers. 186
Although HCFA claimed that this strategy was "consistent
with the law and the intent of Congress," '187 this claim is open to the
strong objection that the HIOs being approved in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were functioning almost
identically to HMOs. As with HMOs, the HIO primary care prov-
iders were at financial risk under standards designed by the HIO,
with complex reimbursement arrangements that "skirt[ed] along
the edges of the TEFRA prohibition. ' 188 TEFRA had limited non-
183. See 42 C.F.R. § 434.2 (1985) (defining health insuring organization); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID REQUIREMENTS: HEALTH INSURING ORGANIZATIONS 1
(1985) [hereinafter cited as U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE]; Dallek & Wulsin, supra
note 12, at 283.
184. See STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, supra note 163, at § 2102(m); U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, supra note 183, at 1. HCFA's position is based on the wording of
§ 1903(m)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(m)(2)(A), which prohibits federal matching funds to be
used for at-risk payment for services "provided by any entity which is responsible for the
provision" of a range of services (emphasis supplied).
185. See supra note 132.
186. HCFA's invitation was published in the Federal Register. Immediately after ex-
plaining that, because of TEFRA, the Secretary no longer had authority under § 1915(b) to
waive the provisions of § 1903(m), HCFA stated that "[a]lternative arrangements to section
1903(m) waivers may be available to States that would largely meet their objectives consistent
with the law and the intent of Congress. HCFA is prepared to assist States in developing
alternative arrangements." 48 Fed. Reg. 23,214 (1983). As an example of this policy, HCFA
apparently took an active role in encouraging Pennsylvania to structure the HealthPASS
proposal as an HIO. See Roche, State Launches a New Health System for Poor, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1986, at 1-B, col. 6, 3-3 (reporting that HHS officials told Pennsylvania
officials that "an HIO... was like an HMO and could be used exclusively for welfare recipi-
ents, according to the law"). The relative lack of required internal control between an HIO
and its providers occurs because, in theory, the HIO is not "providing" care, but only "pay-
ing" for it; in HCFA's view the HIO "may [not] assume a medical responsibility for serv-
ices." STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, supra note 163, § 2102(F).
187. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,214 (1983), discussed in supra note 186.
188. Dallek & Wulsin, supra note 12, at 283. Indeed, according to a report in the Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Health and Human Services (i.e., HCFA) officials told Pennsylvania offi-
cials that an HIO "was like an HMO and could be used exclusively for welfare recipients,
according to the law." Roche, supra note 186, at 3-B.
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HMO risk contracts to those that covered only inpatient hospital
care or to any two of the other five mandated Medicaid services
(such as physicians' services and laboratory/X-ray services).189 Put
simply, an HIO could insulate its subcontracts with physicians from
the requirements of section 1903(m) only if the physicians' capi-
tated rate included no more than physicians' services and one other,
such as laboratory/X-ray. HIOs such as CitiCare in Louisville and
HealthPASS in Philadelphia (both designed by Health America,
Inc., to serve 40,000 and 100,000 patients respectively) comply with
this limitation as a matter of form but then create two other
funds-for specialist referrals and hospitalization-and give physi-
cian case managers a share of any accumulated surplus. 190 The re-
sult is to create a kind of physician financial risk for hospitalization
that is arguably beyond the limits of section 1903(m).
In addition to accepting this strong financial incentive against
specialist referrals and hospitalization, HCFA also ran into similar
quality assurance and access problems in the CitiCare HIO that
characterized the AHCCCS program. According to health policy
analyst Bruce Spitz,
[CitiCare's utilization review] plan was never submitted and
never developed. Two CitiCare committees set up to address
quality of care, and particularly to hear patient complaints, never
issued guidelines or sanctioned any providers. No protocol was
developed for CitiCare. There were no routine client reviews.
The Health America information system that was to assist in the
monitoring of quality of care did not become operational until
February 1984, eight months after the program had begun en-
rolling clients .... The state had abdicated its role to monitor
and assure compliance [with quality assurance standards]. 191
The lack of quality assurance data made it difficult to understand a
major statistical anomaly in the CitiCare experience. Although
most HMOs achieve reductions in hospitalization compared to the
fee-for-service system by reducing hospital admission rates, Citi-
Care's hospital admission rate per 1,000 clients actually in-
189. TEFRA accomplished this by eliminating the Secretary's authority to waive the at-
risk contracting provisions of § 1903(m). See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 137(b)(19), 96
Stat. 380 (1982). Section 1903(m)(2)(A) itself, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. II
1984) limits federal financial participation in non-HMO at-risk contracts to inpatient hospital
care or any two of the other five mandated Medicaid services.
190. See Spitz, supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing CitiCare); HealthPASS, Schedule "B":
Payments for Enrollees, Enrollee Limitations (n.d.); cf Somers, supra note 12, at 307-08
(describing a similar physician reimbursement system used by HMO of New Jersey).
191. Spitz, supra note 12, at 18.
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creased. 192 On the other hand, CitiCare achieved a spectacular
reduction in hospital length-of-stay, from an average of 7.9 days
before the program began to an average of 3.8 days in the first six
months of the program,19 thereby raising serious concerns about
underservice. According to Spitz,
[i]f clients were not underserved, then three things had to have
happened. First, CitiCare was dealing with hospitals that had
provided one inappropriate day of care for every necessary hospi-
tal day. Second, CitiCare was able to identify that inappropriate
care, and third, it was able to eliminate this care within six
months.' 9
4
These underservice concerns were highlighted by a federal lawsuit
by CitiCare patients against CitiCare and the state alleging viola-
tions of the statutory guarantees of access to quality care, as well as
the requirements regarding cost effectiveness and efficiency. 195 The
suit was dismissed as moot after Kentucky terminated the CitiCare
program in June 1984.196
At the request of the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, the GAO investigated HCFA's HIO regulations and
reported in November 1985 that they did not specify minimum
qualifications for HIOs, quality assurance methods, access assur-
ance standards, the amount of retained profit, utilization and finan-
cial reports, or financial and ownership information.19 7 Congress
then amended section 1903(m) in April 1986 to make clear that an
HIO "that does more than simply act as a fiscal agent to review and
process claims for payment, but actually arranges with other prov-
iders (through subcontract or otherwise) for the delivery of [Medi-
caid] services" is subject to all the regulatory requirements
governing HMOs and other prepaid entities under section




195. See Kinley v. CitiCare, No. C 83-0984 (W.D. Ky., Mar. 6, 1984) (memorandum
opinion and judgment dismissing state and individual defendants and causes of action based
on federal and state cost-effectiveness provisions, but denying motion to dismiss causes of
action based on federal statutory guarantees of access to quality care and constitutional
grounds).
196. See NHeLP, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management Systems: What We've
Learned, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE RaV. 270, 272 n.12 (1984).
197. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 183, discussed in HOUSE
CONF. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1985).
198. See HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1985); Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9517(c)(1),
100 Stat. 82, 216 (1986).
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tial threat to patient-centered care, its "grandfather" clauses left in
place several previously-approved HIOs designed to enroll over
100,000 recipients.1 99 This is not to suggest that all HIOs will nec-
essarily provide inadequate access and low quality care, but rather
that the relative lack of internal and regulatory oversight increases
the risk that these problems will occur.
In its regulations and administration under section 1915(b), its
HIO policy, and its administration of section 1115 waivers, HCFA
has followed a policy of minimal regulation of Medicaid PCCM.
Major failures such as the Arizona AHCCCS program between
1982 and 1984 have led to greater intervention in particular cases,
but there has been no explicit commitment to change the agency's
basic policy orientation. For example, HCFA largely acknowl-
edged at the June 1984 House hearing that it had been unable to
monitor access to and quality of care in the AHCCCS program be-
cause of the failure of the state to collect relevant information from
providers."° Both the GAO and Governor Babbitt attributed the
lack of data at least in part to physician prepayment. Unlike the
fee-for-service system, which requires submission of claims in order
to obtain payment, the prepaid capitation system contains no such
incentive.20' In response, HCFA stated that its waiver renewal for
AHCCCS would require the state to include in its contracts with
providers "a penalty clause to reduce payments to those providers
who do not provide accurate, timely encounter data. ' 20 2  But
although lack of quality assurance data because of prepayment is a
widespread problem in PCCM systems, HCFA apparently did not
incorporate the contract penalty provision into general policy. For
example, such penalties were not included in HCFA's waiver guide-
199. HIOs that became operational prior to January 1, 1986, were exempted from the
change, and those that had received a § 1915(b) waiver prior to January 1, 1986, were ex-
empted from the 75% ceiling and disenrollment requirements of 1903(m) for the duration of
the waiver. See COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9517(c)(2), 100 Stat. 82, 216 (1986). The
Secretary of HHS was also authorized to expand and/or reinstate waivers granted under
§ 1915(b) to two named projects in Oregon and Wisconsin. See COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, §§ 9522, 9524, 100 Stat. 82, 217, 218 (1986). Despite this second round of legislative
clarification, the House Budget Committee (and the relevant substantive committees, see
supra note 141) believe that HCFA is continuing to promote its preference for HIOs in viola-
tion of federal law, by granting Philadelphia's HealthPASS and two other HIOs the broader
exemptions for pre-1986 "operational" HIOs, when they should qualify (in the House's view)
only for the more limited exemptions granted to HIOs that became operational after January
1, 1986. See H.R. REP. No. 727, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1986).
200. See Medicaid Issues, supra note 112, at 187 (Zimmerman/GAO testimony); 227,
229-30 (Feinstein/HCFA testimony).
201. See id. at 203 (Zimmerman/GAO testimony), 168 (Babbitt testimony).
202. Id. at 227 (Feinstein/HCFA testimony).
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lines issued in August 1985.203
D. The Consequences of Federal PCCM Policy for the
Patient-Centered Ideal
HCFA's Medicaid PCCM policies have undercut the patient-
centered ideal of health care in at least three major ways. First,
HCFA (along with some state agencies) has made no effort to apply
the statutory goals of access and quality to the structure of the fi-
nancial incentives themselves. Nothing in sections 1915(b) or 1115
requires HCFA to accept any particular financial incentive
designed by a health plan or proposed by a state agency. On the
contrary, the widespread recognition of reimbursement systems' in-
fluence on physician decisions suggests that "treatment neutral" re-
imbursement0 4 and positive financial incentives to achieve access
and quality goals should be built into the reimbursement system.
Surely the most obvious lesson of the open-ended, fee- and cost-
based reimbursement era is the futility of designing strong financial
incentives in one direction, and then attempting to counteract them
with regulations such as utilization review and health planning.
That lesson has been consistently confirmed in early Medicaid
PCCM projects such as AHCCCS and CitiCare. Strong financial
incentives to deny care-and even information about care-have
often overwhelmed efforts to "monitor" and "evaluate" the system
months and even years after the risks have occurred.
A second, related threat to the patient-centered ideal has been
the weakness of mechanisms to assure access to and quality of care.
Aside from restructuring financial incentives, there will likely al-
ways be a need for other safeguards, such as protocols, data analy-
sis, peer review, grievance systems, and monitoring by advocates
and recipients. Here, too, HCFA could have taken the lead by giv-
ing waiver priority and perhaps extra financial support to programs
that made serious efforts to develop technically sophisticated and
client-responsive systems. Instead, it has been congressional com-
mittees and the GAO, together with a small number of state agen-
cies, providers, recipients and their advocates and allies, who have
made the major contributions in this area.
203. See STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, supra note 163 at §§ 2100-2110. According to an
undated memorandum issued by the Pennsylvania state Medicaid agency, providers partici-
pating in the Philadelphia HIO (HealthPASS) who fail to submit encounter forms will have
their entire monthly capitation allotment withheld. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Wel-
fare, Office of Medical Assistance, Quality of Care in HealthPASS, at 3.
204. See Berenson, supra note 23.
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A third problem has been the new PCCM systems' difficulty in
coordinating their activities with providers who specialize in health
and social services for the poor. The Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program under Medicaid, pro-
grams for maternal and child health and nutrition, family planning
programs, and drug, alcohol, and mental health treatment pro-
grams are prominent examples. Many of these programs are
funded by HCFA itself or by other divisions within HHS. Yet
HCFA has done little to promote coordination among these sys-
tems, sometimes with tragic results.2 °5
III. RESPONDING TO THE THREAT TO THE PATIENT-
CENTERED IDEAL: TOWARD AN ETHICAL SYSTEM OF
MEDICAID PRIMARY CARE CASE
MANAGEMENT
Low-income patients have almost always received health care
under conditions that undermine the patient-centered ideal.2 06
Contemporary cost-containment measures such as PCCM could
worsen this inferiority by reducing reimbursement, codifying
through contracts the separateness of poor people's health care sys-
tems, building negative financial incentives into the heart of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, and dismantling countervailing traditions
of medical ethics, law, and public policy. The most effective re-
sponse to this threat-a political reorientation at the national level
that would yield universal coverage for adequate health benefits-is
not likely to occur during the short term. Nevertheless, political
efforts to defend the patient-centered ideal at the national level re-
main important, as the congressional experience with HIOs and
other quality of care issues demonstrates. 0 7
A second possible avenue of response-federal litigation to en-
force statutory guarantees of access to and quality of care--is un-
205. A detailed examination of coordination problems in Wisconsin is presented in
CENTER FOR PUBLIC REPRESENTATION/COMMUNITY BASED MATERNAL AND CHILD
HEALTH PROJECT, MEDICAID, HMO's, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH (1986) [here-
inafter cited as MEDICAID, HIMO's, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH]. For an account
of a patient death possibly related to an HMO refusal to authorize treatment for drug addic-
tion, see Jones, HMOs Squeeze the Health Care Dollar, Milwaukee J. Mag., Apr. 6, 1986.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8.
207. On congressional response to HCFA's HIO policy, see supra text accompanying
notes 181-99. On related congressional initiatives to protect access to and quality of care in
the context of cost containment, see COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 9211 (shortening re-
quired effective period for Medicare patients to disenroll in HMOs); 9405 (subjecting HMO
services to Medicare patients to Peer Review Organization (PRO) quality of care review);
9403 (authorizing PROs to deny Medicare reimbursement for substandard care).
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likely to provide significant protection for patients, at least under
current statutory provisions. To be sure, cases involving particular
statutory requirements may have merit and even produce victories
for patients,2" 8 and litigation that does not yield a victory may still
buy valuable time, publicity, and opportunity for negotiation.20 9
But even at the height of the political and legal movement to legal-
ize welfare rights in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the federal
courts were reluctant to review the "substantive adequacy of wel-
fare efforts."21 That reluctance has increased in the 1980's.2"
When one adds to this general point the likelihood of great judicial
deference to the Secretary's discretion in granting waivers, 21 2 the
lack of mandatory congressional directions regarding access and
quality in section 1915(b) and in section 1115, and the Supreme
Court's extremely restrictive approach to enforcing federal statu-
tory provisions perceived as impositions on state budgets,213 the
prospects for vigorous federal judicial enforcement of the current
access and quality protections appear rather dim. One exception to
this prognosis may lie in the enforcement of contracts between
states and providers by patients as third-party beneficiaries, because
these contracts are often more specific than the federal statute and
regulations, or are less exclusively linked to administrative
enforcement.21 4
A third area of response lies in the development and application
of malpractice law to complex cost-containment systems such as
208. See Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984) (Secretary of HHS has
a statutory duty to establish an information and enforcement system to ensure that Medicaid-
funded nursing homes actually provide high quality medical care).
209. See, eg., Rosenblatt, supra note 64, at 298, 303.
210. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431,
1490 (1986) (citation omitted); see also Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits,
in THE POLrrIcs OF LAW 262 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
211. See, eg., Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985) (unanimous Supreme Court
upholds Tennessee's refusal to pay for more than 14 days of hospitalization under the Medi-
caid program against challenge that such limit discriminates against the handicapped under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that the "bill of rights" contained in the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6010, does not create
enforceable rights and obligations).
212. See Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976); California Welfare Rights
Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
213. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
214. See, eg., Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 689 (N. D. Ohio 1977) (although a
resident of a Medicaid-funded nursing home has no federal cause of action to enforce federal
regulations regarding patient transfer against the nursing home, there is a state-law cause of
action as a third-party beneficiary because the federal regulations are incorporated into the
contract between the state agency and the nursing home).
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PCCM, particularly in the light of the detailed contracts between
state agencies and providers and among providers themselves. Mal-
practice law has yet to play a significant role in policing cost con-
tainment, particularly for the poor. 15 On the other hand, one can
easily imagine the development of doctrines that enforce primary
care physicians' ethical and legal duties to their patients and that
also impose a duty of care on physicians and nurses engaged in utili-
zation review and quality assurance to exercise reasonable care on
behalf of the patients affected by their actions.216
A fourth avenue of response holds out significant promise and is
in fact taking place: the development through experience and advo-
cacy of the operational elements of what might be called an "ethical
cost-containment system." As a matter of general theory, ethical
cost containment represents an effort to take seriously and to recon-
cile both the need for cost containment and the values of access,
quality, and patient-centeredness that form our ideals of health
care. Given the history of Medicaid PCCM, three implications are
apparent for Medicaid policy: (1) to end, as much as possible, the
separation of Medicaid patients from mainstream health institu-
tions, (2) to structure financial incentives and quality assurance pro-
grams so as to avoid financially motivated denial of beneficial care,
and (3) to promote the values of patient-centered care through pa-
tient and provider education and involvement. This involvement
might include grievance mechanisms, monitoring programs, and
appropriate connections with other providers of health and human
services.
These general policies can be translated into operational compo-
nents of an ethical Medicaid-PCCM system. First, as the National
Health Law Program pointed out in Senate testimony, "careful
planning is essential for an effective program .... One would not
expect a $180 million business with 150,000 customers to set up
shop in 4 months, but that is exactly what Arizona did [with the
215. See Rosenblatt supra note 97, at 1414-19; S. LAw & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT:
THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 19-20 (1978); cf Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost
Containment: Tightening the Screws, in this Symposium.
216. One case raising these issues was recently decided by a California appellate court.
See Wickline v. State of California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing a jury
award of $500,000 to a Medicaid patient for loss of a leg allegedly caused by premature
hospital discharge, itself said to be caused by the negligent failure of a consulting physician
and nurse reviewer working for the state Medicaid utilization review program to authorize
the necessary extended hospital stay). For an argument that the legal standard of care should
be diminished for certain physicians practicing under cost constraints, see Morreim, in this
Symposium.
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AHCCCS program]." '2 1 7 Crucial planning tasks include setting the
capitation rate and other financial incentives and establishing mech-
anisms for patient enrollment and education, provider enrollment
and education, financial disclosure and auditing of providers, data
collection, quality assurance, grievance procedures, participation by
interested parties in policy development, and coordination with
other health and social service systems. These steps may appear to
be "obvious," but they have been repeatedly ignored or inade-
quately handled in many of the Medicaid PCCM programs.218
Of particular interest is the role of recipient and advocate partic-
ipation in the process of planning, implementing, and monitoring
PCCM. Analysts of Medicaid PCCM generally agree that "com-
munity support appears very important to the success of such pro-
grams, especially during implementation."21 9 Yet many programs
have been "planned by a small group of responsible individuals
from state government who had little time to consider the concerns
expressed by certain constituencies .... "220 The result in Louisville
was a "poor relationship between CitiCare, the local medical society
and legal aid and welfare rights organizations... with select wel-
fare rights organizers charging CitiCare with lack of cooperation
and inadequate health care delivery." '221 According to Spitz, this
poor relationship was instrumental in the state's ultimate decision
to terminate the project.222 Similarly, the effort to establish a major
PCCM project in Boston was blocked at least in part by recipient
opposition.223
In contrast, the experience of other states-notably Wisconsin
217. Medicaid Freedom of Choice Waiver Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1984) (statement of Judith
G. Waxman, J.D., NHeLP, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as NHeLP testimony], re-
printed in NHeLP, supra note 196.
218. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 165-80 (discussion of AHCCS program);
NHeLP testimony, supra note 217; Spitz, supra note 12, at 17-19; Dallek, supra note 2, in this
Symposium; Center for Public Representation, Health for Mothers and Children: Options,
Problems and Recommendations (July 1985) (evaluating Wisconsin's Preferred Enrollment
Initiative (PEI) as of 1985); Brief in Opposition to the Granting of a Waiver to Pennsylvania's
Case Management Proposal, Before the Secretary of Health and Human Services (n.d.); Brief
in Opposition to the Supplement of Pennsylvania's Application for a Waiver Under the Social
Security Act, Before the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Nov. 12, 1985).
219. D. FREUND, supra note 16, at 8; see also Spitz, supra note 12, at 17-19.
220. D. FREUND, supra note 16, at 8.
221. Spitz, supra note 12, at 18.
222. Id.
223. See Medicaid Freedom of Choice Waiver Hearing, supra note 217, at 125 (testimony




and Michigan- demonstrates the positive contributions that can be
made by active involvement of Medicaid recipients and their advo-
cates and allies in PCCM programs. In Wisconsin, a coalition of
public interest advocates, legal-services attorneys, nurses, county
human-services departments, and groups concerned With hunger,
nutrition, birth defects, children's health, and family planning have
made impressive efforts to monitor the operation of the state's pro-
gram requiring AFDC recipients to enroll in HMOs and to suggest
constructive improvements.' 4 In the wake of a tragic death of a
five month-old child covered by Medicaid in December 1985, ap-
parently caused by confusion about HMO coverage of emergency
care, and the extensive press coverage of this and similar inci-
dents, 22 5 Wisconsin agreed to significant changes in its HMO con-
tracts for Medicaid patients proposed by consumers and their
advocates.22 6 These changes included clearer explanations for con-
sumers of emergency care, HMO liability for all subsequent care
related to telephone calls to which the HMO fails to respond in
thirty minutes, and HMO payment for appropriate diagnostic tests
needed to determine if an emergency exists. These changes also in-
clude extensive provisions dealing with confidential family planning
for adolescents, services for disabled persons, and early and periodic
screening for children. 27
Michigan represents what is probably the most serious large-
scale effort to reconcile PCCM with the ideals of patient-centered
care through financial incentives and recipient and advocate partici-
pation. First, rather than impose the strong negative financial in-
centive of capitation on all providers, Michigan has a carefully
224. See MEDICAID, IMO's, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH, supra note 205;
Memoranda from Catherine L. Gaylord (Apr. 10 and Mar. 21, 1986) (summarizing advocacy
activities during Spring 1986, including detailed suggestions for program evaluation); Memo-
randum from Carol Huber, Center for Public Interest Representation (Feb. 14, 1986) (listing
participants in the coalition).
225. See Manning, Mother says Infant Died after HMO Refused Care, Milwaukee Senti-
nel, Dec. 12, 1985 at 1 col. 1; Manning, HMO Rule Faulted in Tot's Death, Milwaukee Senti-
nel, Feb. 7, 1986, at 1; Jones, supra note 205; Jones, Bitter Pill, Milwaukee J., Apr. 13, 1986;
see also Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium.
226. See MEDICAID, HMO's, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH, supra note 205, at
23-29; Memorandum from Catherine L. Gaylord, Attorney, Center for Public Interest Rep-
resentation, (Apr. 22, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Gaylord Apr. 22, 1986 Memorandum] (giv-
ing detailed summary of changes to protect consumers embodied in the contract between the
Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Services and HMOs signed Feb. 1, 1986).
227. See citations supra note 226. Significant advocacy by legal services programs on
behalf of Medicaid patients regarding PCCM has taken place in other states, notably Ari-
zona, California, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See, eg., NHeLP, supra note 196; Dal-
lek, supra note 2, in this Symposium.
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graduated system, with full risk capitation for all Medicaid services
extended only to large HMOs with a sizeable enrollment and ad-
ministrative capacity. Smaller primary care clinics receive capita-
tion payment for ambulatory services and can share in the state's
savings on hospitalization. Under a third program, known as the
Primary Physician Sponsor Program (PPSP), individual primary
care physicians serve as case managers and control access to refer-
rals and hospitalization. The primary care physicians are not at fi-
nancial risk and receive a $3 per client per month case-management
fee up to $3,000 per month.228 These physicians must practice
"within utilization and cost standards jointly established by the
state medical societies and the state .... Thus as organizational
capacity decreases and the likelihood of wide statistical variation
among the enrolled patients increases, as it does when the enrolled
population declines in size, the state moves from strong financial
incentives to direct review and control.12 29
In addition to carefully designed financial incentives, Michigan
relies heavily on recipient, advocate, and provider participation in
policymaking and program implementation. After an initial period
of exclusion and opposition, welfare rights organizations and clients
were given prominent places on the projects' advisory boards.230
Moreover, an organization representing Medicaid clients, the Mich-
igan League of Human Services, has a contract with the state
agency to monitor the implementation of PPSP. Its contract in-
cludes marketing, client enrollment, geographic accessibility,
twenty-four hour availability of services, referrals and second opin-
ions, and protection of clients' rights.2 31 The League has produced
impressive surveys and reports on these issues. These reports in-
clude such seemingly mundane but actually crucial matters as a
"busy signal study" of the PPSP patient service telephone line that
showed that 3,790 calls in a typical one-week period could not be
completed because the telephone lines were tied up.232 Many of the
problems typical of PCCM remain in the PPSP program, but "[b]y
sharing decisionmaking and monitoring powers, the state has cre-
ated a situation where providers and clients have become vested in
228. Spitz, supra note 12, at 19-20.
229. Id.
230. See D. FREUND, supra note 16, at 6-7.
231. See Spitz, supra note 12, at 19; McDonald & Fairgrieve, Michigan's Experiment with
Case Management, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 423 (1986).
232. See MICHIGAN LEAGUE FOR HUMAN SERVICES, PHYSICIAN PRIMARY SPONSOR
PLAN MONITORING PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT, SEPT. 1984-AUG. 1985, at 4 (Sept. 1985);
McDonald & Fairgrieve, supra note 231, at 429 & passim.
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the programs' success." '233
The contrasting experiences of Wisconsin, Michigan, Arizona,
and Kentucky suggest that rigid dichotomies between "public" and
participatory administration on the one hand and "market competi-
tion" and financial incentives on the other are unnecessary and
counterproductive. In Wisconsin an active coalition of consumer
and social services groups has made significant contributions to the
state's market-oriented HMO initiative. In Michigan a state Medi-
caid agency working with providers, Medicaid patients, and advo-
cates and using both regulatory and financial incentives has
developed programs that can potentially grapple with the ethical
and managerial issues of PCCM. The early experiences of Arizona
and Kentucky (and other states as well)2 34 suggest that these issues
cannot be avoided and that unregulated private administration and
at-risk contracting are likely to encounter major problems of cost
and quality of care.
IV. MEDICAID PRIMARY CARE CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE
POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION
The development of Medicaid PCCM programs can and should
be seen as part of a larger debate over the future of the American
welfare state. Without this larger context, it is hard to understand
the deep commitment of key federal and state officials to unregu-
lated private management of Medicaid in the face of well-known
risks of financial irregularity and low quality care.235 The debate
itself has been heavily shaped by advocates of market competition
who have argued strenuously that government efforts to supply,
fund, and regulate important services have failed and that what
have previously been thought of as public functions should be
turned over to private, for-profit entities. 23 6 But the Medicaid
PCCM experience suggests that the general concept of "privatiza-
tion" does not so much resolve questions about redistribution and
government role as cast them in a new language for continued con-
troversy. As Paul Starr writes,
Privatization, as a general idea, describes a direction of change,
but does not denote a specific origin or destination. Its specific
233. Spitz, supra note 12, at 20.
234. See Dallek, supra note 2, in this Symposium.
235. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 153, 217-18; Dallek, supra note 2, in this
Symposium. See also Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 655-61; R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra
note 6, at 53 (making analogous point about early years of Medicaid).
236. See, e.g., A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 1; P. STARR, supra note 2, at 417-19.
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uses depend on the point of departure [i.e., the public/private
balance in previous institutional arrangements] .... And it is a
critical question whether moving from public to private in the
sense of state to non-state entails a movement in the other senses
[of public to private]: that is, from open to closed (for example,
in rights of access) or from the whole to the part (for example, in
the distribution of benefit). 237
The "destinations" of a privatizing strategy can thus vary enor-
mously. They may include the personal and informal sector (e.g.,
where local self-reliance is expected to replace public provision), the
voluntary nonprofit sector (involving complex organizations based
on philanthropy and professionalism), the small business sector,
and the large corporate sector.238 Similarly, the purposes of a
privatizing strategy can differ sharply. The purposes may range
from use of the private sector as a means of realizing governmental
goals (such as delivery of health care to the poor) to "radical priva-
tization, [requiring] drastic withdrawal of government" from previ-
ous functions such as welfare or environmental regulation. 239 These
different purposes have also been described as the "empowerment"
side of privatization, in which government funding is used to
strengthen private providers of public needs, as opposed to "load-
shedding," in which the government withdraws from both service
financing and service delivery.24
In the light of these distinctions, the simple dichotomy in Medi-
caid policy between the "government" and the "private sector"
does not hold. In fact, Medicaid has always relied heavily on pri-
vate doctors and hospitals to deliver services and has been justifia-
bly criticized for being too passive and subservient to their
interests.241 The Reagan administration's Medicaid policy repre-
sents not so much a shift of services from the public to the private
sector as a shift of administration from the public to the private for-
profit sector, with the immediate goal of "loadshedding" or reduc-
237. Starr, supra note 20, at 6.
238. See id. at 8.
239. Id. at 9-10.
240. See Bendick, Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services 203, in PROJECT ON
THE FEDERAL SOCIAL ROLE, WORKING PAPER 6: PRIVATIZATION (1985). For a somewhat
similar distinction between true health care cost containment, which attempts to reduce the
amount of resources employed to produce a given volume of services, and "ersatz cost con-
tainment" which, like "loadshedding," seeks only to reduce outlays by a particular payor
(and which usually increases expenditures by other payors and even increases unit costs), see
Vladeck, Equity, Access, and the Costs of Health Services, in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
241. See, e.g., R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 6; SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 26.
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ing federal financial commitments. Private Medicaid administra-
tion is then expected to reorganize the private sector, essentially
incorporating small businesses (physician practices) and voluntary
nonprofit hospitals into for-profit models of reimbursement and
management characteristic of large corporations. The ultimate
ideal under this vision is to eliminate large-scale state contracting
with private Medicaid administration and substitute vouchers or
cash payments to the poor that would then be turned over to the
even more fragmented and private administration of health plans
and insurance companies.
As in the Michigan example, a more patient-centered version of
PCCM would seek a mix of public and private functions, performed
by different types of institutions, to maximize efficient delivery, high
quality, and patient responsiveness of care. Under this approach,
the authority and competence of both governmental and private in-
stitutions could grow as the state takes more sophisticated responsi-
bility through contracting and performance standards for assuring
that adequate and available care is delivered through private health
care organizations that themselves have more responsibility and
flexibility for meeting patients' needs. Moreover, other types of
"private" organizations-coalitions of advocates, social service
providers, and recipients-could be strengthened and play an im-
portant and constructive role. Such an approach would necessarily
depend on a continued financial commitment by the federal and
state governments to avoid loadshedding and to finance needed
health care services.
Another difference between radical privatization and the pa-
tient-centered approach to PCCM concerns the consciousness of
health and health care as individual and social issues. In August
1985, HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler released the Report of the
Secretary's Task Force on Black & Minority Health. The Task
Force noted that it was "a unique and historic assemblage in its
own right .... [T]he first time that representatives of [Department
of HHS] ... programs were joined in a common effort to ... investi-
gate the longstanding disparity in the health status of Blacks, His-
panics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans compared to
the nonminority population." '242 The Task Force found, for exam-
ple, that blacks under the age of forty-five suffered almost 23,000
"excess deaths" per year-that is, deaths that would not have oc-
242. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HHS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON
BLACK & MINORITY HEALTH, VOLUME ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1985).
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curred had the black population had the same age and sex-specific
death rate as the nonminority population.243 These excess deaths
constituted 47.4 percent of all black's deaths, and included over
6,000 deaths due to infant mortality. 2' The Task Force considered
these facts a health problem worthy of public notice and response
and recommended extensive public programs regarding patient edu-
cation, improved and innovative health care delivery through Medi-
caid and other publicly financed programs, and massive
improvements in data collection and research.245
One wonders how these concerns would fare in a fully priva-
tized voucher or cash payment system. The dollar value of such
vouchers probably would be minimal-well below the higher-than-
average costs of health care for the poor.246 The cut-rate for-profit
providers who would enter this market probably would not have the
capacity or the inclination to mount innovative programs. Even
more fundamentally, the voucher system explicitly encourages peo-
ple to conceive of health care as a private market transaction be-
tween an individual patient and a health care provider or insurance
company.247 The very capacity of our culture to inform itself about
patterns of health and health care and to mount a public response
would possibly be lost in the "stark utopia" 248  of radical
privatization.
243. Id. at 5, 3.
244. Id. at 5.
245. See id. at 9-45.
246. See CBO, An Analysis of the National Health Care Reform Act of 1981 (H.R. 850),
(Sept. 1981), in Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health
Care: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways & Means Comm., 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 44-45 (1981).
247. See Iglehart, supra note 20, at 293 (quoting then OMB-Director David Stockman's
policy goal of "once again mak[ing] health care an economic good ... so that we can bring
into play those self-regulatory, economizing, efficiency-producing mechanisms that we rely
on in all other sectors.").
248. K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3 (1944, Beacon Press paperback ed.
1957). Polanyi used the phrase "stark utopia" to refer to the advocates of unregulated mar-
kets in nineteenth century England. Radical privatization is likely to undermine our cultural
capacity to perceive the social patterns of health problems not only as a matter of thought,
but also as a practical matter of data collection. See Mundinger, Health Service Funding Cuts
and the Declining Health of the Poor, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 44, 45 (1985) (noting that the
National Center for Health Statistics has been subjected to a 28% staff reduction between
1981 and 1985, and that in March 1985 the Office of Management and Budget drafted a
proposal that would prohibit agency data collection unless an agency could show that the
information was essential to its mission, was unlikely to be collected by the private sector, and
would yield benefits in excess of its costs).
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